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STRUCTURED TO FAIL: 
LESSONS FROM THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S FAULTY PANDEMIC PLANNING AND 
RESPONSE 
 




The Trump Administration’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic is a stark reminder that 
poorly designed government can be a matter of life and death. This article explains how the 
Administration’s careless and delayed response to the crisis was made immeasurably worse by its 
confused and confusing reallocation of authority to perform or supervise tasks essential to 
reducing the virus’s ravages.  
 
After exploring the rationale for and impact of prior federal reorganizations responding 
to public health crises, the article shows how a combination of unnecessary and unhelpful 
overlapping authority and a thoughtless mix of centralized and decentralized authority contributed 
to the Trump Administration’s slow and ineffective effort to stem the virus’s tide. Furthermore, the 
Administration’s earlier dismantling of the structure built in the wake of prior outbreaks disabled 
a mechanism crucial to any federal response to public health threats—its ability to coordinate the 
efforts of public and private actions to effectively combat the crisis. 
 
The article identifies numerous valuable lessons about government organization from the 
COVID-19 experience that should guide policymakers’ deliberations in the likely event that they 
embark upon an effort to address the mistakes plaguing the Trump Administration’s dismal 
response. More generally, it uses the government’s response to COVID-19 to explore a number of 
insights about how to better think about and configure government institutions to prepare for and 




The spread of a virulent pathogen poses challenges to governance even under the best 
circumstances.1 But society stands the best chance of minimizing illness and death, just as it does 
in addressing myriad social problems, if it is well-organized to take on those challenges. 
Unfortunately, the Trump Administration’s planning for and response to the COVID-19 pandemic 
provide a stark reminder that poorly designed government can be a matter of life and death. The 
Administration’s public recognition or acknowledgment of the severity of the crisis was, to put it 
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mildly, slow to develop.2 President Trump himself was well aware of the health threats posed by 
COVID-19 at the very early stage of the pandemic, but nonetheless downplayed those threats in 
public comments.3 Kenneth Barnard, a retired Rear Admiral, a physician, and a top security and 
health advisor for both Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush, put it simply as the virus’s toll in 
the United States increased: “Delays in response cost lives. When you lose time with an epidemic, 
it really matters.”4  
 
But the bungled initial response (or lack of response) was made worse by the 
Administration’s confused and confusing reallocation and abdication of authority to perform or 
supervise tasks essential to reducing the virus’s ravages.5 That reordering disabled an important 
mechanism available to the federal government to respond to public health threats—its ability to 
coordinate the efforts of public and private actions to effectively combat the crisis. And its earlier 
dismantling of the structure built in the wake of prior outbreaks to respond to the spread of 
contagious diseases6 contributed to its inability to craft plan for or implement a coherent and 
effective response to a virus to which millions of Americans were exposed and which killed 
hundreds of thousands in the last year of the Trump Administration. 
 
Clearly, the manner in which government is organized to deal with public health crises is 
not the only determinant of the success or failure of its management of such crises. For example, 
priority-setting, the adequacy of the resources devoted to the problem, and the commitment and 
                                                          
2 See  Eric Lipton et al., He Could Have Seen What Was Coming: Behind Trump’s Failure on the Virus, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 11, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/11/us/politics/coronavirus-trump-response.html (noting that it 
took the president five weeks to take aggressive action to confront the coronavirus danger after the first coronavirus 
case was identified in the United States). The President also sought to stoke distrust in science and curry favor with 
segments of the population who were more concerned about restrictions on their autonomy caused by public health 
directives, in the hopes of boosting his reelection chances. See Paul Waldman, How Trump Will Hijack the Coming 
Vaccine Wars, WASH. POST (May 19, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/05/19/how-trump-will-
hijack-coming-vaccine-debate/ (arguing that a “lack of a vaccine [before the elections in November] will become part 
of his wide-ranging attack on science and expertise, an argument that casts scientists and public health experts (along 
with China, and Democrats, and whomever else he’s mad at) as the villains of the pandemic story.”); see also Michael 
D. Shear & Sarah Mervosh, Trump Encourages Protest Against Governors Who Have Imposed Virus Restrictions, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/17/us/politics/trump-coronavirus-governors.html 
(“Openly supporting [protestors] who challenge the stay-at-home orders could help the president re-energize the 
coalition of conservative Republicans and working-class populists who agree with the anti-government sentiment that 
helped power Mr. Trump’s election victory in 2016.”); Renée Graham, Trump’s Death Cult Presidency, BOSTON 
GLOBE (May 26, 2020), https://www.bostonglobe.com/2020/05/26/opinion/trumps-death-cult-presidency/ (noting 
that staunch Trump supporters are willing to die to get back to life as usual, stating that “[p]eople are behaving as if 
their inalienable rights include ignoring public safety guidelines and endangering others in the middle of a pandemic”). 
3 See Nancy Cook, Meredith McGaw & Adam Cancry, What Did Trump Know and When Did He Know It? Inside His 
Feb. 7 Admission, POLITICO (Sept. 10, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/09/10/trump-coronavirus-bob-
woodward-412222. The Director of the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) understood the dangers posed by the 
pandemic very early in 2020, and “[t]hroughout January, President Trump received memos from advisors and reports 
from intelligence agencies, which he may or may not have read, explaining that the COVID-19 outbreak in China was 
serious and ultimately would pose a tremendous threat to the United States.” Michael J. Klarman, Foreword: The 
Degradation of American Democracy – And the Court, 134 HARV. L. REV. 1, 101 (2020) (adding that “President 
Trump repeatedly downplayed the threat of the coronavirus”). 
4 Kimberly Dozier & Vera Bergengruen, Under Fire for Coronavirus Response, Trump Officials Defend Disbanding 
Pandemic Team, TIME, Mar. 19, 2020, https://time.com/5806558/administration-officials-fight-criticism/. 
5 See infra Part IV. 
6 See infra Part III. 
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competence of the officials charged with pandemic planning and response all have the capacity to 
influence a pandemic’s impact for better or worse.7 Organization matters, however, in that poorly 
organized programs can derail even well-funded and conscientious efforts to stem the adverse 
social consequences of a public health crisis such as a viral pandemic.  
 
The federal government’s planning and response to COVID-19 provide several more 
general lessons about how to analyze and organize government institutions to better address social 
problems.8 How government authority is allocated can profoundly influence the fate of 
government programs—even though analysis of such structural matters is often subordinated, if it 
is considered at all, to considerations about the substantive tools of government programs and the 
procedures used to implement them. The current public health crisis highlights the importance of 
recognizing that (1) government performs a variety of different functions, (2) authority to address 
social problems is necessarily allocated along several dimensions of authority, and (3) 
policymakers should consider differentiating allocations of authority along these dimensions on a 
function-by-function basis. Moreover, organizational choices should be driven by analysis of the 
policy tradeoffs that alternative allocations of authority entail. Recognition that these tradeoffs 
exist and careful consideration of how to resolve them should be critical components of 
policymakers’ deliberations as they design government institutions to prepare for and manage 
complex social problems like a pandemic. 
 
The opportunity for federal policymakers to engage in the kind of multi-faceted analysis 
we propose here is likely to be imminent. It seems clear that a reckoning is coming. At local, state, 
federal, and even international scales, policymakers from different political persuasions are 
wondering how the structure of inter-governmental organization might have failed in handling9 
the worst public health crisis in at least a century.10 Members of Congress have called for hearings 
like those that occurred after the crisis that began the twenty-first century—the 9/11 attacks—to 
explore the reasons for the federal government’s deficient response to COVID-19.11 The 
investigations and analysis conducted by the 9/11 Commission, which Congress created to better 
prepare for the threat of future terrorist attacks, culminated in a report that recommended structural 
                                                          
7 See also infra notes 28-32 and accompanying text. 
8 See infra Part VI. 
9 See, e.g., Dan Balz, Crisis Exposes How America Has Hollowed Out Its Government, WASH. POST, May 16, 2020 
[hereinafter Balz, Crisis] (discussing debate over whether a new wave of “government reinvention” is an appropriate 
response to COVID-19 and recommendations that any such reform focus on “finding ways to improve how agencies 
collaborate when confronted with the kind of crisis now facing the country”), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/politics/government-hollowed-out-weaknesses/; Mara Liasson, 
Coronavirus Response Shows How a National Crisis Can Again Transform Politics, NPR, Apr. 22, 2020, 
https://www.npr.org/2020/04/22/839965140/coronavirus-response-shows-how-a-national-crisis-can-again-
transform-politics (arguing that the pandemic could result in an expanded role for the federal government and lead to 
policy changes that “rearrange traditional political divisions”); Eli Nachmany, Legislative Hurdles and Unintended 
Consequences: Potential Pitfalls of Vice President Biden's Interest in Cabinet Restructuring, 5/9/2020 U. CHI. L. REV. 
ONLINE 1, 2 (2020) (“Given the extraordinary spending and policing measures that have characterized state and federal 
responses to the virus to date, it is not inconceivable that even a divided Congress might rethink the form of America's 
public health bureaucracy.”). 
10 The 1918-1919 influenza pandemic, commonly known as the “Spanish Flu,” resulted in the death of 675,000 
Americans and over 50 million people worldwide.” Georges C. Benjamin, Pandemic Influenza: Preparing for the 
Worst, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 663, 663 (2006).  
11 See infra Part VI. 
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reforms in the nation’s intelligence-gathering apparatus12 and the adoption of legislation to 
implement those recommendations.13 It seems likely that policymakers will debate whether and 
how to pursue a similar structural reconfiguration in federal pandemic response authority to 
address the lessons learned from COVID-19.14 
 
This article explores how the organization of the Trump Administration’s public health 
authorities adversely affected federal planning and responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. As with 
most other institutional design assessments, it is not possible to fully cordon off federal pandemic 
planning and response from the broader social, economic, and regulatory context in which it exists. 
As the experience with COVID-19 has demonstrated, the ripple effects of a serious viral pandemic 
can extend into all corners of the nation’s—indeed the Earth’s—social and economic fabric. Most 
notably, federal pandemic planning and response will necessarily be affected by, and affect, a 
range of government action or inaction taken at the local, state, and international levels. Although 
this article considers some of the interactions among federal and state officials in planning for and 
responding to the pandemic, it confines its analysis to the impact of the Trump Administration’s 
allocation of authority among federal officials. 
 
Similarly, a capacious conception of pandemic planning and response might extend beyond 
the article’s focus on the direct federal public health efforts to plan for and respond to the pandemic 
to minimize the number of people who become ill or die from the disease. Pandemic planning and 
response might be understood as involving allocations of public authority over the entire range of 
regulatory sectors, such as health care, education,15 social welfare,16 and financial and other 
markets.17 Accordingly, the range of governmental activities one might consider in evaluating 
public pandemic management could theoretically include authority at every governmental scale 
                                                          
12 NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT (2004), 
https://9-11commission.gov/report/. 
13 See ALEJANDRO E. CAMACHO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, REORGANIZING GOVERNMENT: A FUNCTIONAL AND 
DIMENSIONAL FRAMEWORK 149-70 (NYU Press 2019) (discussing the 9/11 Commission’s report, the Intelligence 
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638 (2004), and how that legislation failed to 
reorganize intelligence-gathering authority in ways likely to address the problems identified by the 9/11 Commission). 
14 The House passed a bill in April 2020 that would establish a select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis as an 
investigate subcommittee of the Committee on Oversight and Reform. H. Res. 935, 116th Cong. (2020), 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-resolution/935. Legislation was also introduced in the Senate 
that would direct the Director of the Office of Management and Budget to convene an Interagency Task Force to 
analyze the preparedness of the United States for national pandemics. S. 4204, 116th Cong. (2020), 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/4204/text;. State legislators have also begun analyzing 
pandemic response authority. See, e.g., California State Senate, Special Committee on Pandemic Emergency 
Response, https://www.senate.ca.gov/special-committee-pandemic-emergency-response (listing oversight hearings 
concerning COVID-19). 
15 See, e.g., Julie M. Donohue & Elizabeth Miller, COVID-19 and School Closures, 324 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 845 
(2020), https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2769033. 
16 E.g., U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Relief During COVID-19 Outbreak, 
https://www.dol.gov/coronavirus/unemployment-insurance. 
17 See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS, SHARED RESPONSIBILITY, GLOBAL SOLIDARITY: RESPONDING TO THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
IMPACTS OF COVID-19, at 1 (Mar. 2020), https://unsdg.un.org/sites/default/files/2020-03/SG-Report-Socio-
Economic-Impact-of-Covid19.pdf (“The [International Monetary Fund] projects recovery in 2021 only if the world 
succeeds in containing the virus and take[s] the necessary economic measures.”); Int’l Monetary Fund, Policy 
Responses to COVID-19: Policy Tracker, https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-covid19/Policy-Responses-to-
COVID-19 (last visited June 6, 2020) (“summariz[ing] the key economic responses governments are taking to limit 
the human and economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic”). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3770368
DRAFT: Jan. 20, 2021 




and virtually every regulatory sector.  Indeed, we have argued that careful assessment of each of 
the many overlapping and intersecting regulatory ecosystems is vital for more effective design of 
public governance.18  Yet a review of these countless structural components is outside the scope 
of this brief article.  In our view, the article’s focus on the manner in which federal planning and 
response can affect efforts to minimize spread of the disease effectively illustrates the value of the 
delineated dimensional and functional framework for considering public organizational 
alternatives. Our hope is that this example can serve as a template and catalyst for other analyses 
that explore allocational configurations and tradeoffs governing these intersecting areas of 
governance.  
 
The article is structured as follows. Part II describes why government organization, though 
not the only variable in determining the fate of government programs, can help accomplish or 
impede public policy goals. It describes an innovative framework for evaluating alternative 
structural configurations for government programs. The framework rests on two insights: (1) that 
governmental authority is organized along three different but interrelated dimensions; and (2) that 
governmental structures can and often should differ based on the function being performed. Part 
III explores government reorganizations that occurred in the George W. Bush and Obama 
Administrations in response to public health crises, as well as the rationale for and impact of those 
reorganizations. 
 
In Part IV, we describe the Trump Administration’s planning for and response to the 
COVID-19 pandemic, focusing on the nature of each of these functions along each of the three 
dimensions of authority identified in our framework. Unfortunately, the combination of 
unnecessary and unhelpful overlapping authority, thoughtless mix of centralized and decentralized 
authority, and, perhaps most importantly, lack of coordination among multiple agencies and 
authorities, contributed to a slow and ineffective effort to stem the virus’s tide.  
 
Part V identifies six broader lessons about government organization that the United States’ 
COVID-19 experience has provided thus far. It suggests that these lessons should guide 
policymakers’ deliberations in the likely event that they embark upon an effort to reorganize the 
federal government’s public health infrastructure to avoid the organizational mistakes that have 
plagued the Trump Administration’s dismal planning for and response to COVID-19. In particular, 
it provisionally identifies how a reliance on decentralized, overlapping, and horizontally 
coordinated federal planning and decentralized, distinct, and hierarchically coordinated federal 
response actions are likely to better balance the tradeoffs implicated in managing a pandemic than 
the approach pursued by the Trump Administration. 
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION 
It is hard to imagine a better and more compelling illustration of the importance of good 
government than managing a pandemic. Suddenly, it is blindingly obvious that, while individuals 
can and must play their part in minimizing risks to the health and the safety of themselves and their 
families, government action and inter-governmental coordination are essential to an effective 
                                                          
18 See CAMACHO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 13, at 234-35. 
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societal response.19 Government can negotiate with foreign governments for samples of the virus 
to use in developing tests and vaccines.20 It can provide the crucial information people need to 
make decisions about how to respond to serious public health risks, such as by social distancing 
and wearing masks.21 Public authorities can impose essential restrictions on travel and large public 
gatherings that risk accelerating the virus’s spread.22 They can devote resources to developing 
better testing and contact tracing methods.23 Government can make sure that medical equipment 
and facilities are available and that treatments are safe and effective.24  
 
 These activities do not (or should not) occur spontaneously. They require the development 
of comprehensive plans for responding to a pandemic before its appearance, which must then be 
implemented through response activities when the risk becomes a reality. At the federal level, the 
aspects of pandemic planning and response with which we are concerned refer to those particular 
public health activities directed at monitoring, containing, and mitigating the spread of a disease.25 
In this article, federal pandemic planning includes those early-stage governmental activities 
intended to consider, develop a framework for, and/or guide decisions for later governmental 
                                                          
19 Cf. Lawrence O. Gostin & Benjamin E. Berkman, Pandemic Influenza: Ethics, Law, and the Public’s Health, 59 
ADMIN. L. REV. 121, 153 (2007) (“Cooperation among national authorities and coordination by international bodies 
is therefore necessary.”). 
20 See Laura Grebe, Requiring Genetic Source Disclosure in the United States, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 367, 373 (2011) 
(noting that “during the avian influenza (bird flu) outbreak in the early 2000s, many scientists and researchers obtained 
virus samples from Indonesia and Thailand—two countries on the front line of the growing pandemic . . . and vaccines 
to fight the avian influenza were quickly developed”). 
21 See, e.g., R. Gregory Evans & Rachel D. Schwartz, Preparedness and Response Paralysis: Ramifications for 
Pandemic Planning, 6 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 594, 610 (2009) (noting that public health “planners and the bodies they 
represent naturally turn to their governments for guidance and information on how to proceed”). 
22 See Trygve Ottersen et. al., Ebola Again Shows the International Health Regulations Are Broken: What Can Be 
Done Differently to Prepare for the Next Epidemic?, 42 AM. J.L. & MED. 356, 377 (2016) (“A prevailing 
recommendation after the H1N1 pandemic, therefore, was to strengthen compliance with the [International Health 
Regulations’] provisions on travel and trade restrictions.”); Mark A. Rothstein, From SARS to Ebola: Legal and 
Ethical Considerations for Modern Quarantine, 12 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 227, 234 (2015) (endorsing “a federal role 
in coordination, technical support, and prevention of the interstate and international spread of contagion”). 
23 See, e.g., Megan McArdle, The Government Should Cover Coronavirus Testing. And Conservatives Should Support 
It., WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/03/03/government-should-cover-
coronavirus-testing-conservatives-should-support-it/. 
24 See, e.g., Eileen M. Kane, Achieving Clinical Equality in an Influenza Pandemic: Patent Realities, 39 SETON HALL 
L. REV. 1137, 1159 (2009) (“[T]the development of a pandemic vaccine is likely to be initiated through a unique and 
coordinated sequence of events: public health authorities’ identification of a consensus virus for vaccine development, 
followed by vaccine design and clinical testing, and then official purchasing by national governments from 
commercial manufacturers to build stockpile capacity.”). 
25 See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., PANCAP ADAPTED: U.S. GOVERNMENT COVID-19 RESPONSE PLAN 
6, 9 (Mar. 13, 2020), https://int.nyt.com/data/documenthelper/6819-covid-19-response-
plan/d367f758bec47cad361f/optimized/full.pdf [hereinafter PANCAP]. The Government Accountability Office has 
described “[t]he mission of the federal response” as being “to leverage available federal resources to prepare for, 
respond to, and recover from COVID-19,” and referred to PanCap’s aim as “help[ing] federal departments and 
agencies to coordinate activities to limit the spread of COVID-19; to mitigate the effect of illness, suffering, and death; 
and to sustain critical infrastructure and key resources in the United States.” U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., COVID-
19: Opportunities to Improve Federal Response and Recovery Efforts, GAO-20-265, at 87 (2020), 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/710/707839.pdf [hereinafter GAO-20-265]. For the scope of this paper, mitigation does 
not include economic and social engineering such as the provision of stimulus checks or unemployment insurance, 
which are meant to mitigate the adverse economic impacts of a pandemic, for reasons described above. See supra note 
18 and accompanying text 
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action in preparation for disease or a pandemic.26 Complementarily, federal pandemic response 
refers to the range of activities that occur after advent of (and intended to neutralize) a disease 
event, ideally in implementation of pandemic planning activities, including monitoring, 
containment, and the distribution of treatments.27  
 
The success of such government initiatives in managing a pandemic depends on many 
factors. Of course, the effectiveness of disaster planning and response, and government more 
generally, is influenced by the interest, competence, and good faith of government personnel;28 
                                                          
26 When the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) issued its COVID-19 Response plan (PanCap) in 
March 2020, it cited several sources of its authority to do so, including the Public Health Service Act, Pub. L. No. 78-
410, 58 Stat. 682 (1944) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq.; 42 U.S.C. §§ 300hh-1 and 300hh-16). 
PANCAP, supra note 25, at 6. As of early 2020, that Act required the Secretary of HHS to prepare the National Health 
Security Strategy and “an accompanying plan for public health preparedness and response.” 42 U.S.C. § 300hh-
1(a)(1). The Strategy must describe potential emergency health security threats and identify the process for achieving 
specified “preparedness goals.” Id. These goals include (1) integrating public health and private medical capabilities; 
(2) developing capabilities for disease detection and investigation, disease containment (including capabilities for 
isolation, quarantine, social distancing, and distribution of health care services and supplies), and risk communication 
and public preparedness; (3) ensuring coordination of federal, state, local, and tribal planning, preparedness, and 
response; and (4) improving inter-governmental coordination “to prevent, detect, and respond to outbreaks of . . . 
zoonotic disease,” taking into account human and animal interactions. Id. § 300hh-1(b). “All available evidence for 
COVID-19 suggests that SARS-CoV-2 has a zoonotic source.” World Health Org., Coronavirus Disease 2019 
(COVID-19): Situation Report-94 (2020), https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/situation-
reports/20200423-sitrep-94-covid-19.pdf; see also John S. MacKenzie & David W. Smith, COVID-19—A Novel 
Zoonotic Disease: A Review of the Disease, the Virus, and Public Health Measures, 32 ASIAN PAC. J. PUB. HEALTH 
145 (2020), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1010539520931326.  . Cf. CAMACHO & GLICKSMAN, supra 
note 13, at 27 (defining planning). 
27 As described below at notes 146-49 and accompanying text, the White House Coronavirus Task Force created on 
January 27, 2020 established a Unified Coordination Group (UCG) to serve as “the primary field entity for federal 
response.” GAO-20-265, supra note 25, at 89. The UCG established a series of operational task forces “to provide 
operational guidance and secure resources to coordinate the whole-of-government response to COVID-19.” Id. at 90. 
The responsibilities of these task forces help define the parameters of the federal government’s response to COVID-
19, as the term response is used in this article. The task force responsibilities included coordinating testing supply 
chains and needs; ensuring the availability of protective equipment and other health care workers, facilities, and 
supplies; developing community mitigation strategies to slow disease spread and reduce morbidity and mortality; 
establishing baseline understanding of medical countermeasures; providing comprehensive data and analytics to 
support “evidence-based decisions for COVID-19 response and recovery operations,” such as demand for ventilators, 
personal protective equipment, and therapeutics; and maintaining situational awareness and coordination across 
federal agencies. Id. at 91-92. We think that actions to monitor, contain, and distribute treatments for the disease 
encapsulates the UGC’s description of the “whole-of-government” response it was charged with leading. For purposes 
of this article, response does not include research and development activities by government scientists or private 
pharmaceutical companies pertaining to treatments such as new vaccines, as these activities largely implicate the 
financing function (and we focus on planning and implementation) and involve public-private relationships (while we 
confine our analysis largely to intergovernmental allocations of authority). 
28 See, e.g., Steve Cogen, COVID-19 Requires a Competent, Professional Federal Government, STATE OF THE 
PLANET, EARTH INST., COLUMBIA UNIV., Mar. 30, 2020, https://blogs.ei.columbia.edu/2020/03/30/covid-19-requires-
competent-professional-federal-government/; Jennifer Rubin, It’s Not About the Size of the Government. It’s About 
Competence., WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/04/20/its-not-about-size-
government-its-about-competence/. 
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the extent of resources provided;29 the efficient and fair distribution of these resources;30 and the 
particular forms of substantive strategies31 and processes adopted.32 But even the best-designed 
and well-informed plans are likely to go awry if government is not organized in ways that facilitate 
rather than hinder public and private capacity to respond to social problems that individuals, 
businesses, and other private institutions cannot tackle on their own.   
 
In a recent book,33 we explained the importance of organization to effective, accountable, 
and fair government. The case studies we explored revealed that it is important to distinguish 
among three dimensions of authority—the extent to which government authority is centralized (or 
decentralized),34 overlapping (or distinct),35 and coordinated (or independent).36 There may be 
good reasons to prefer organizing government toward one end of a dimension, but countervailing 
advantages to structuring government toward the other end. For instance, having distinct and clear 
authority over certain jobs or functions can help reduce the risk of conflicting regulation.37 For 
some others, having overlapping authority can help provide a regulatory safety net if one agency 
or level of government falters.38 Though there might be an impulse to consolidate authority, there 
                                                          
29 See, e.g., Edgar Walters, Before Texas Can Safely Reopen Its Economy, Health Experts Say These Four Things 
Must Happen, TEX. TRIBUNE, Apr. 27, 2020, https://www.texastribune.org/2020/04/27/texas-coronavirus-health-
experts-say-more-resources-needed-reopen/ (noting opinions of public health experts that successful containment of 
the virus Texas would require “personnel and lab capacity for testing and contact tracing that is perhaps an order of 
magnitude greater than what is currently available”). 
30 See, e.g., Anya van Wagendock, The Government Is Distributing Emergency Covid-19 Supplies. But Some States 
Are Losing Out., VOX, Mar. 29, 2020, https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2020/3/29/21198704/emergency-
covid-19-supplies-fema-states-federal-government. Some sources have reported that the Trump Administration 
provided preferential treatment in its Covid-19 response to the President’s political allies. See, e.g., Jill Colvin, Calling 
Trump: When Connections Help Steer Virus Supplies, AP, Apr. 11, 2020, 
https://apnews.com/4b50dd9806e6d31607b23dfe38df4408; Jonathan Allen, Phil McCausland & Cyrus Farivar, Want 
a Mask Contract or Some Ventilators? A White House Connection Helps, NBC NEWS, Apr. 24, 2020, 
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/political-influence-skews-trump-s-coronavirus-response-n1191236 
(discussing “how Trump and his top aides have played favorites in awarding contracts and allocating scarce 
resources”). Controversy also arose when members of Congress were among those to whom one of the approved 
COVID-19 vaccines was first made available. See Stephen Loiaconi, Members of Congress Face Backlash as They 
Get Priority for Scarce Vaccine, 13WHAM ABC NEWS (Dec. 21, 2020), https://13wham.com/news/connect-to-
congress/vaccination-of-members-of-congress-spurs-backlash-questions-of-fairness. 
31 See, e.g., Jonathan Todres, Pamela L. Marcogliese & Laurel R. Hyle, International Health Law, 40 INT'L LAW. 453, 
455 (2006) (discussing meeting of representatives of over 100 countries under the auspices of the World Health 
Organization to fashion national and international pandemic preparedness and response plans to address the threat of 
avian influenza).  
32 See, e.g., Lance Gable, Evading Emergency: Strengthening Emergency Responses Through Integrated Pluralistic 
Governance, 91 OR. L. REV. 375, 390 (2012) (stating that because “public health emergencies are discrete events that 
present significant threats to health that are distinct from the health challenges endemic to a population . . . [p]rocedures 
designed to govern the health system and to protect health in everyday circumstances may not be capable of handling 
the novel challenges posed by a public health emergency”). 
33 CAMACHO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 13. We provide a partial and preliminary introduction to our framework in 
Alejandro E. Camacho & Robert L. Glicksman, Functional Government in 3-D: A Framework for Evaluating 
Allocations of Government Authority, 51 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.19 (2014). 
34 CAMACHO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 13, at 32-37. 
35 Id. at 38-43. 
36 Id. at 43-49. 
37 Id. at 40. 
38 Id. at 42-42. 
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are real  advantages (in expertise and accountability) to keeping some authority decentralized.39 
And keeping authority independent can prevent groupthink, reduce administrative costs, and even 
reduce the risk of government inaction.40 But coordination of governmental authority can be 
helpful in managing a sudden and multi-faceted problem, like a pandemic, that requires rapid 
action by multiple public and private entities.41 
  
To make informed choices about which organizational options to select, policymakers 
should assess the trade-offs of allocating authority at different points along each dimension and 
determine which configuration is optimal.42 These assessments are context-specific, and the 
configuration of authority should be toggled differently to address different components of the 
problem. Different types of coordination (varying from mere communication to opportunities to 
comment, to harmonization, to more hierarchical relationships) can have dissimilar advantages, 
and different forms can be deployed in diverse contexts.43 Our book’s case studies also highlight 
the value of varying these allocations of authority for different government functions (such as the 
planning and implementation functions assessed in this article, but also information distribution, 
analysis of information, setting regulatory standards, and enforcing those standards),44 instead of 
choosing, as is often done, the same structure for each task the government is charged with 
addressing.45 In short, it is important to be thoughtful about the organizational choices and their 
tradeoffs, and to adapt these allocations to account for new information or changes in 
circumstances. Failing to do so runs the risk that government programs will operate ineffectively 
or in ways that conflict with social values to which policymakers are committed. 
III. PRIOR REORGANIZATIONS IN RESPONSE TO PAST OUTBREAKS 
The degree to which the organization of government can facilitate or hinder the pursuit of 
objectives such as effective and efficient pandemic planning or response should not have come as 
a surprise in 2020.46 In 2005, President George W. Bush directed his homeland security adviser to 
                                                          
39 Id. at 34-35. 
40 Id. at 47-49. 
41 Id. at 44-46. 
42 See id. at 50 (Figure 2.5) (summarizing the different justifications for allocating authority at different ends of each 
dimension). 
43 See id. at 45-46 (describing a spectrum of different forms of coordination and arguing that each form of coordination 
“will have its own set of advantages and disadvantages”). 
44 See id. at 26 (Figure 1.2) (listing categories of functional jurisdiction). 
45 See id. at 25-30. 
46 For discussion of lessons learned from earlier public health crises, including the post-World War I Spanish flu 
pandemic, see Wendy E. Parmet, Pandemics, Populism and the Role of Law in the H1N1 Vaccine Campaign, 4 ST. 
LOUIS U.J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 113, 115-24 (2010); Jeff Thaler, 2020 Vision: What Can a Governor Do When the 
2nd COVID-19 Surge Comes?, AMER. CONST. SOC’Y EXPERT FORUM (May 19, 2020), 
https://www.acslaw.org/expertforum/2020-vision-what-can-a-governor-do-when-the-2nd-covid-19-surge-comes/. 
The Disaster Relief Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-288, § 201(a), 88 Stat. 143, 145, authorized the President 
“to establish a program of disaster preparedness” that would include “preparation of disaster preparedness plans for 
mitigation, warning, emergency operations, rehabilitation, and recovery,” and “coordination of Federal, State, and 
local preparedness programs.” The statute defined a disaster primarily in terms of weather-related events, but also 
included “other catastrophe[s].” Id. § 102(2) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5122) (defining a “major disaster”). The Trump 
Administration’s 2019 PanCap plan cited the 1974 Act as a source of authority. See PANCAP, supra note 25, at 6. 
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develop a national pandemic strategy after reading a book about the flu pandemic of 1918.47 The 
strategy was designed to address both planning (or preparedness) and response. It was comprised 
of three “pillars”: preparedness and communication, surveillance and detection, and response and 
containment.48 The planning components included: (1) working with multilateral health 
organizations such as the World Health Organization to support the development of pandemic 
response plans and (2) working with states and localities to develop medical surge capacity plans 
and integrate the private sector and critical infrastructure entities into planning efforts.49 The 
response and containment component included (1) specified measures to slow or limit the spread 
of the outbreak, (2) activation of plans to distribute medical countermeasures, (3) assisting the flow 
of public health and medical personnel and medical equipment to areas of need, (4) encouraging 
the development of “coordination mechanisms” across American industries, (5) activation of 
contingency plans, (6) ensuring effective risk communication to the public, and (7) working with 
state and local government to assure the safety of the food supply.50 Indeed, the Bush strategy 
repeatedly emphasized the importance of coordination within and between governments and 
between governments. and the private sector with respect to both planning51 and response.52 
 
The next year, Congress enacted the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act 
(PAHPA).53 Like the Bush strategy, the 2006 Act recognized the need for federal interagency 
coordination. It charged the Secretary of HHS with leading all federal public health and medical 
response to public health emergencies and incidents covered by the National Response Plan 
developed pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002.54 PAPHA directed the Secretary to 
collaborate with various cabinet heads to establish an interagency agreement under which the 
Secretary would assume “operational control of emergency public health and medical response 
assets, as necessary, in the event of a public health emergency.”55 The Act also created a new 
                                                          
47 Dan Balz, America Was Unprepared for a Major Crisis. Again., WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 2020, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/politics/america-was-unprepared-for-a-major-crisis-again/; Angela 
Marino, The Cost of a Countermeasure: The Expansive Liability Protection of the Public Readiness and Emergency 
Preparedness Act of 2005, 20 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 199, 199 (2009). 
48 HOMELAND SECURITY COUNCIL, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA 3 (2005), 
https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/pdf/pandemic-influenza-strategy-2005.pdf; see also Michelle A. 
Daubert, Comment, Pandemic Fears and Contemporary Quarantine: Protecting Liberty Through A Continuum of 
Due Process Rights, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 1299, 1345 (2007) (describing the three “pillars” of the Bush strategy). 
49 Id. at 4. 
50 Id. at 8-9.  These components of the Bush response strategy are similar to the elements of what we define as 
pandemic response in this article – actions to (1) monitor, (2) contain (through mechanisms such as distribution of 
medical equipment (including testing devices and personal protective equipment) and communication about the 
incidence and location of infections and ways to halt its spread (including social distancing and mask wearing), and 
(3) distribute treatments for the disease. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text. 
51 Id. at 2 (“Preparing for a pandemic requires the leveraging of all instruments of national power, and coordinated 
action by all segments of government and society.”); see also id. at 4 (noting the importance of coordinated planning), 
5 (establishing goal of facilitating coordination of vaccination manufacturing efforts); id. at 11 (recommending that 
states and localities coordinate crisis communication plans). 
52 Id. at 8 (noting intention to “develop a coalition of strong partners to coordinate actions to limit the spread of a virus 
with pandemic potential beyond the location where it is first recognized in order to protect U.S. interests abroad”); id. 
at 9 (referring to the need to coordinate risk communication to inform the public and mitigate panic in the midst of a 
pandemic); id. at 10 (establishing as a federal responsibility coordinating the sitri8bution of disease countermeasures 
“in concert with states and other entities”). 
53 Pub. L. No. 109-417, 120 Stat. 2832 (2006). 
54 Id. § 101(2) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300hh(a)). 
55 Id. (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300hh(b)). 
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position within HHS, the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR), whose 
responsibilities include coordination with other federal officials “to ensure integration of Federal 
preparedness and response activities for public health emergencies,” and to coordinate with state, 
local, and tribal public health officials “to ensure effective integration of Federal public health and 
medical assets” during such an emergency.56 Further, PAPHA provided that every four years, 
beginning in 2009, the HHS Secretary would prepare and submit to relevant congressional 
committees “a coordinated strategy (to be known as the National Health Security Strategy) . . . and 
an accompanying implementation plan for public health emergency preparedness and response.”57 
 
The outbreak of the Ebola virus in 2014 increased attention on the importance of 
government organization, and particularly the critical role of coordination, in promoting effective 
responses to global health threats.58 In February 2014, then-Secretary of Health and Human 
Services (“HHS”) Kathleen Sebelius and the Director-General of the World Health Organization 
announced the formation of the Global Health Security Agenda (“GHSA”).59 Their goal was to 
accelerate international implementation of the 2005 International Health Regulations,60 which, 
among other things, address public health preparedness and response capacities concerning public 
health threats. Later that year, the Congressional Research Service (“CRS”) identified issues for 
congressional consideration relating to the GHSA. It noted that there was then no formal 
mechanism for convening interagency meetings about implementation of the GHSA. CRS 
therefore urged legislators to consider “What agency, if any, should coordinate these efforts . . . to 
avoid duplication of efforts and ensure efficient and effective use of U.S. resources?”61 
 
 Consistent with the GHSA’s goals, President Obama decided to enhance the government’s 
pandemic management capacity. Some, such as Senator John McCain, had criticized the Obama 
Administration for having no one in charge of coordinating the various independent and at times 
overlapping federal authorities involved in Ebola response management and for failing to 
                                                          
56 Id. § 101(3) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300hh-10(a), (b)(4)). 
57 Id. § 103 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300hh-1(a)(1)). 
58 See Tsung-Ling Lee, Making International Health Regulations Work: Lessons from the 2014 Ebola Outbreak, 49 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 931, 937 (2016) (arguing that “the international control of infectious disease is essentially a 
coordination game,” and using the Ebola crisis as an example). The World Health Organization, for example, 
established a Review Committee to identify weaknesses in global planning and responses to international health 
emergencies. Id. at 937 & n.17. 
59 See Lisa Monaco, Making the World Safer from Pandemic Threats: A New Agenda for Global Health Security 
(Feb. 13, 2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2014/02/13/making-world-safer-pandemic-threats-new-
agenda-global-health-security. The Agenda was an international effort that was designed to enhance capacity, 
particularly in resource-poor countries, “to prevent, detect, and respond to outbreaks of infectious disease threats.” 
Id.; Congressional Research Serv., The Global Health Security Agenda (2014-2019) and International Health 
Regulations (2005) 1 (Dec. 19, 2014), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10022 [hereinafter Global 
Health Security Agenda]. 
60 WORLD HEALTH ORG., INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS (2d ed. 2005), 
/www.who.int/ihr/publications/9789241596664/en/. 
61 Global Health Security Agenda, supra note 59, at 2. Anticipated preparedness and prevention measures included 
improving immunization capacity, improving diseases surveillance and monitoring systems, and developing and 
disseminating diagnostic tools. To enhance effective outbreak responses, the Agenda aimed at “creating an 
interconnected global network of Emergency Operations Centers, establishing rapid response teams worldwide, 
operating a global reagent resource, and developing response communications and crisis planning and management 
tools.” Id. 
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implement measures such as imposing travel bans and quarantines.62 According to the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS),63 “in the aftermath of the slow, uncoordinated, and 
resource-intensive response to the Ebola crisis in West Africa, the White House [National Security 
Council (NSC)] staff created the Global Health Security and Biodefense Directorate,” which was 
“[d]esigned to plan for and oversee rapid, efficient, government-wide responses to global health 
security threats.”64 The Directorate would coordinate both pandemic planning and response at all 
levels of government.65 
 
 According to Beth Cameron, who headed the Directorate as the Senior Director for Global 
Health and Biodefense, the Directorate’s mission, was “to get ahead: to accelerate the response, 
empower experts, anticipate failures, and act quickly and transparently to solve problems.”66 It 
served as an “early warning system for impending pandemics.”67 The Directorate reported to a 
senior-level response coordinator on the NSC staff, the National Security Adviser, and the 
homeland security adviser.68  
 
                                                          
62 Deirdre Shesgreen, ‘Gross Misjudgment’: Experts Say Trump’s Decision to Disband Pandemic Team Hindered 
Coronavirus Response, USA TODAY, Mar. 18, 2020, 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2020/03/18/coronavirus-did-president-trumps-decision-disband-global-
pandemic-office-hinder-response/5064881002/. 
63   “[T]he Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) is a bipartisan, nonprofit policy research organization 
dedicated to providing strategic insights and policy solutions to help decisionmakers chart a course toward a better 
world.”  CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES,63 ENDING THE CYCLE OF CRISIS AND COMPLACENCY 
IN U.S. GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY: A REPORT OF THE CSIS COMMISSION ON STRENGTHENING AMERICA’S HEALTH 
SECURITY ii (2019), https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/publication/191122_EndingTheCycle_GHSC_WEB_FULL_11.22.pdf [hereinafter CSIS CYCLE OF CRISIS]. 
64 Id. at 17. See also Ronald Klain, Coronavirus Is Coming—And Trump Isn’t Ready, THE ATLANTIC, Jan. 30, 2020, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/01/now-trump-needs-deep-state-fight-coronavirus/605752/; NSC 
Directorate for Global Health Security and Biodefense Dissolved, https://climate.law.columbia.edu/content/nsc-
directorate-global-health-security-and-biodefense-dissolved (last visited May 24, 2020); Reuters Examines Changes 
To CDC, NSC Epidemiology, Pandemic Response Staff Under Trump Administration, Mar. 26, 2020, 
https://www.kff.org/news-summary/reuters-examines-changes-to-cdc-nsc-epidemiology-pandemic-response-staff-
under-trump-administration/. 
At the same time, President Obama issued an executive order to implement the GHSA. Exec. Order No. 
13747, Advancing the Global Health Security Agenda to Achieve a World Safe and Secure from Infectious Disease 
Threats, 81 Fed. Reg. 78701 (Nov. 9, 2016). The order created a GHSA Interagency Review Council whose 
responsibilities included providing “policy-level guidance to participating agencies on GHSA goals, objectives, and 
implementation,” and facilitating “interagency, multi-sectoral engagement to carry out GHSA implementation.” Id. 
§ 2(b)(i). The Obama Administration recognized the importance of coordination across the federal government to deal 
with both domestic and international aspects of pandemic planning and response, directing the federal agencies that 
comprised the Council to “coordinate with other agencies that are identified in this order to satisfy programmatic 
goals, and further facilitate coordination of country teams, implementers, and donors in host countries.” Id. § 3(a)(vi).  
65 See Emily Berman, The Roles of the State and Federal Governments in A Pandemic, 11 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & 
POL’Y 61, 78 (2020) (emphasis added)  (“When the Obama Administration's experience with Ebola in 2014 drove 
home the gravity and immediacy of pandemic threats, it established a Directorate for Global Health Security and 
Biodefense on the National Security Council (NSC), so that a permanent cadre of experts could both plan for and 
implement a response to emergencies such as the one we currently face.”). 
66 Beth Cameron, I Ran the White House Pandemic Office. Trump Closed It., WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2020, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/nsc-pandemic-office-trump-closed/2020/03/13/a70de09c-6491-11ea-
acca-80c22bbee96f_story.html. 
67 Haley Sweetland Edwards, The Trump Administration Fumbled Its Initial Response to Coronavirus. Is There 
Enough Time to Fix It?, TIME, Mar. 19, 2020, https://time.com/5805683/trump-administration-coronavirus/. 
68 Cameron, supra note 66; CSIS, CYCLE OF CRISIS, supra note 63, at 17. 
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The Directorate’s ability to manage a pandemic response was never tested because the 
Trump Administration disbanded it before the outbreak of COVID-19.69 But the Obama 
Administration’s 69-page playbook suggests that had the NSC’s Directorate been in existence, it 
would have been empowered and fairly well poised to lead a coordinated effort to respond to the 
pandemic.70 The Playbook included a “decision-making rubric” for domestic assessment and 
response that committed the U.S. government to “use all powers at its disposal to prevent, slow, 
or mitigate the spread of an emerging infectious disease threat” by limiting spread of disease, 
mitigating the impact illness and death, and sustaining critical infrastructure and key domestic 
resources.71 The NSC (acting through the Directorate) would “serve as an information conduit for 
the Executive Office of the President (EOP) and will coordinate interagency policy discussions 
and decisions.”72 Notably, and in contrast to the Trump Administration’s approach,73 the Playbook 
stated that “[w]hile States hold significant power and responsibility related to public health 
response . . . , the American public will look to the U.S. Government for action when multi-state 
or other significant public health events occur.”74 The Playbook included a detailed grid setting 
forth the somewhat distinct and somewhat overlapping responsibilities of various federal agencies 
with respect to pathogen identification, initial response activation, resource distribution, and long-
term recovery operations.75 
 
A review of the Obama Directorate’s actions between 2016 and 2018 also suggest that it 
had the potential to head up a successful effort. Beth Cameron described the Directorate’s role as 
coordinating both preparations for a pandemic and coordinating “a robust and seamless domestic 
and global response” when a pandemic developed.76 Cameron highlighted the capacity of the 
Directorate “to prepare the United States and the world for the next pandemic, including by 
developing incentives for global leaders and governments to rapidly finance and fill identified 
gaps.”77 The Directorate was charged with coordinating several important governmental functions, 
including information gathering, funding, and planning.78 Had a pandemic developed during the 
Obama Administration, the Directorate would also have been responsible for coordinating 
implementation of responses at all governmental levels. For example, it “would have been 
responsible for coordinating the efforts of multiple federal agencies to make sure the government 
was backstopping testing capacity, devising approaches to manufacture and avoid shortages of 
personal protective equipment, strengthening U.S. lab capacity to process covid-19 tests, and 
                                                          
69 See infra notes 88-103 and accompanying text. 
70 See PLAYBOOK FOR EARLY RESPONSE TO HIGH-CONSEQUENCE EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASE THREATS AND 
BIOLOGICAL INCIDENTS 4, https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6819268/Pandemic-Playbook.pdf 
[hereinafter PLAYBOOK] (“[T]he National Security Council (NSC) and its subordinate policy committees [including 
the Principals Committee (PC), the Deputies Committee (DC), and the Interagency Policy Committees (IPC)] will 
serve as the principal forum for consideration of national security policy issues, including emerging infectious disease-
related national security threats.”); id. at 12 (“The U.S. government international and domestic responses to evolving 
public health crises should be coordinated, as appropriate, through the NSC’s coordination mechanisms.”). 
71 Id. at 31. 
72 Id. 
73 See infra notes 88-103 and accompanying text. 
74 PLAYBOOK, supra note 70, at 31. 
75 Id. at 32-40. 
76 Cameron, supra note 66.  
77 Id.; see also Klarman, supra note 3, at 100 (describing the Directorate’s mission as “preventing or preparing for the 
next pandemic”). 
78 See Edwards, supra note 67. 
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expanding the health-care workforce.”79 Before its elimination, the Directorate began to 
implement its planning mission. For example, it coordinated efforts by federal agencies to monitor 
evolving outbreaks of diseases such as yellow fever and H7N9 influenza so that it could trigger 
alarms if an outbreak seemed problematic. It also coordinated international funding, providing 
financing to fill gaps in other nations’ preparedness or response capacities.80 
 
 In the wake of the Ebola outbreak, Congress also recognized, and acted on, the need for a 
coordinated government response to global public health threats. At the end of 2016, Congress 
enacted the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, which directed the 
Secretaries of Defense, HHS, Homeland Security, and Agriculture to jointly develop a national 
biodefense strategy and associated implementation plan.81 The required contents of the strategy 
and plan include (1) “a description of the roles and responsibilities of executive agencies, including 
internal and external coordination procedures, in identifying and sharing information” about 
terrorist use of biological agents and weapons, and biological outbreaks; (2) an articulation of 
interagency capabilities and “whole-of-Government” activities required to support the strategy; 
(3) recommendations for strengthening biodefense capabilities, authorities, and command 
structures; and (4) improving and formalizing interagency coordination to provide “a robust 
national biodefense.”82 The Act mandated submission by the Secretaries of the strategy and plan 
to appropriate congressional committees.83 
 
Perhaps different or additional organizational choices could have improved on the 
framework created by the Obama Administration and Congress. But the organizational changes 
they endorsed all reflected an understanding, which has since been reinforced by the assessment 
from both former Obama and Trump Administration public health experts, that coordination of 
decentralized and largely independent federal and state authority is an indispensable element of 
                                                          
79 Cameron, supra note 66; see also id. (“It would identify needs among state and local officials, and advise and 
facilitate regular, focused communication from federal health and scientific experts to provide states and the public 
with fact-based tools to minimize the virus’s spread. . . . It would be in charge of sharing information and coordinating 
our public health and humanitarian response with partners and allies.”). 
80 Id.  
81 Pub. L. No. 114-238, § 1086, 130 Stat. 2000, 2423-24 (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 104). The Trump Administration 
published the documents required by the 2017 Act about a year after the statutory deadline, perhaps losing valuable 
time in preparing for the crisis about to occur. The statutory deadline for submission of the strategy to Congress was 
275 days after enactment of the 2017 Act (i.e., July 2017). The Administration released the strategy in September 
2018. See Presidential Memorandum on the Support for National Biodefense (Sept. 18, 2018), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-memorandum-support-national-biodefense/; 
NATIONAL BIODEFENSE STRATEGY (2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/National-
Biodefense-Strategy.pdf. National Security Presidential Memorandum 14, issued a month after the release of the 
Strategy, ordered agencies, under the leadership of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, “to 
ensure an integrated, comprehensive approach” and to “coordinate and manage biodefense activities in support of the 
broader biodefense enterprise.” Posting of the National Security Presidential Memorandum 14, “Support for National 
Biodefense,” 83 Fed. Reg. 52841, 52842 (Oct. 18, 2018). Among other things, it also directed all federal agencies to 
coordinate biodefense policy formulation and information dissemination among themselves and non-federal entities, 
and to “monitor, evaluate, and hold their agencies accountable for implementation of the Strategy,” and delegated to 
the Secretary of HHS the task of ensuring that appropriate resources are provided to a Biodefense Coordination Team 
located within HHS. Id. Unfortunately, as indicated below, the implementation of those coordination mandates left 
much to be desired. 
82 Pub. L. No. 114-238, § 1086(b). 
83 Id. § 1086(c). 
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effective government planning for and responses to wide-ranging public health crises.84 Designed 
well, coordination can (1) promote more efficient response efforts by pooling resources and 
expertise, (2) enhance accountability by identifying and assigning governmental roles to reflect 
differing expertise and capacities and avoid duplication of effort, and (3) harmonize the efforts of 
different governmental bodies to foster synergies and avoid conflicts.85 Unfortunately, the striking 
lack of coordination in the Trump Administration’s response to COVID-19 squandered all of these 
opportunities. 
IV. THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION: DELAY, DISBANDMENT, CONSOLIDATION, AND 
TRIPLICATE AUTHORITY 
 As Part II above indicates, government authority to deal with social problems such as 
public health emergencies is necessarily comprised of one or more governmental functions 
allocated along each of three different dimensions.86 Unfortunately, the Trump Administration’s 
planning for and response to the COVID-19 pandemic was structured poorly along each of these 
dimensions. It was characterized by (1) an illogical combination of more centralized planning and 
decentralized response authority that failed to leverage the beneficial aspects of either; (2) 
particularly for pandemic response, a toxic mix of haphazard overlap and poorly delineated 
authority to different policymakers within the executive branch; and (3) a crippling lack of 
coordination in planning and response, both within the federal government and between the federal 
government, state and local governments and the private sector. The upshot was a delayed, 
confusing, and ineffective effort to combat the virus and hundreds of thousands of potentially 
avoidable illnesses and deaths.87 
 
A. Disbandment and Consolidation of Planning and Response 
The Trump Administration took steps along the centralization-decentralization dimension 
that adversely affected its ability to plan for and respond to COVID-19. In the context of pandemic 
planning, the Administration dissolved an entity whose mission was focused on pandemic planning 
                                                          
84 See Michael Greenberger, The Alfonse and Gaston of Governmental Response to National Public Health 
Emergencies: Lessons Learned from Hurricane Katrina for the Federal Government and the States, 58 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 611, 612 (2006) (“The recent devastation and destruction by Hurricane Katrina in August 2005 in the Gulf Coast 
exemplifies the critical need for better federal, state, and local government coordination during a catastrophic public 
health emergency. Relying on only one or two of these governmental entities, or an uncoordinated response by all 
three, to spearhead disaster relief on a national scale only exacerbates the disaster, costing thousands of lives and 
billions of dollars.”); Elisabeth Belmont et al., Emergency Preparedness, Response & Recovery Checklist: Beyond the 
Emergency Management Plan, 37 J. HEALTH L. 503, 508 (2004) (urging coordination among public health agencies 
and between such agencies and private health care providers, and suggesting “ad hoc restructuring of an organization 
around functional (rather than administrative) lines to better meet the demands of a given emergency situation”) ; cf. 
Lori L. Buchsbaum, The U.S. Public Health Response to Bioterrorism: Need for A Stronger Legislative Approach, 7 
MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 1, 15 (2002) (emphasizing “the importance of coordination among states and between state 
and federal governments in facing threats such as bioterrorism”). 
85 See CAMACHO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 13, at 44-45. 
86 Allocations may but need not differ for various government functions. In Part V below, we suggest that policymakers 
would be well advised to consider differentiating authority along each of the dimensions for two different functions 
relating to pandemic management – planning and response (or plan implementation). 
87 See James Glanz & Campbell Robertson, Lockdown Delays Cost at Least 36,000 Lives, Data Show, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 20, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/20/us/coronavirus-distancing-deaths.html (describing how growth 
of the pandemic could have been better controlled with a more timely and effective federal response). 
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and response and ostensibly merged its responsibilities into an entity with a broader set of 
responsibilities, thus diluting the attention that might otherwise have been devoted to pandemic 
management. Second, the Administration largely defaulted on pandemic response, resulting in a 
decentralized effort led by states and localities that cried out for but that was lacking federal 
coordination. 
 1. Centralization and Dilution of Federal Planning 
In March 2018, President Trump appointed John Bolton as head of the National Security 
Council, replacing H.R. McMaster.88 The day after Bolton took over, National Security Advisor 
Thomas Bossert resigned at Bolton’s request.89 Bossert had urged greater investment90 in global 
health security91 and called for “a comprehensive biodefense strategy against pandemics and 
biological attacks.”92 Within weeks, Bolton dismissed Rear Admiral Timothy Ziemer, who had 
taken over Beth Cameron’s position as head of the Global Health Security and Biodefense 
Directorate in 2017 and was the person responsible for overseeing preparation of the biodefense 
strategy required under the 2017 Defense Authorization Act. 93 
But Bolton did more than just reshuffle personnel. He also quickly disbanded the 
Directorate itself .94 Bolton believed that the NSC’s organizational chart made little sense, that it 
created too many conflicts among its components, and that the NSC staff had grown too large.95 
Some of the Directorate’s authority was shifted to a now-consolidated counter-proliferation and 
biodefense directorate. The refashioned Directorate’s jurisdiction fused weapon arms control and 
nonproliferation, anti-terrorism matters, and global health and biodefense.96 The Trump 
Administration alleged that the changes were meant to “streamline” a “bloated” and leak-prone 
                                                          
88 Cristiano Lima & Matthew Nussbaum, John Bolton to Replace H.R. McMaster as National Security Adviser, 
POLITICO, Mar. 22, 2018, https://www.politico.com/story/2018/03/22/john-bolton-national-security-adviser-hr-
mcmaster-trump-481721. 
89 Josh Dawsey, Greg Jaffe & Ellen Nakashima, White House Homeland Security Adviser Tom Bossert Resigns, WASH. 
Post, Apr. 10, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/white-house-homeland-security-adviser-resigns-amid-
continued-turnover-in-trump-administration/2018/04/10/15db518a-3ccb-11e8-a7d1-e4efec6389f0_story.html. 
90 Lauren Weber, Sudden Departure of White House Global Health Security Head Has Experts Worried, HUFFPOST, 
May 9, 2020, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/tim-ziemer-global-health-security-
leaves_n_5af37dfbe4b0859d11d02290. 
91 Jonathan Landy, White House Developing Comprehensive Biosecurity Strategy: Official, REUTERS, July 20, 2017, 
rs.com/article/us-usa-security-biodefense/white-house-developing-comprehensive-biosecurity-strategy-official-
idUSKBN1A52HZ. 
92 Partly False Claim: Trump Fired Entire Pandemic Response Team in 2018, REUTERS, Mar. 25, 2020, 
uters.com/article/uk-factcheck-trump-fired-pandemic-team/partly-false-claim-trump-fired-pandemic-response-team-
in-2018-idUSKBN21C32M [hereinafter Partly False Claim]. 
93 Ed Yong, Ebola Returns Just as the White House Loses Its Top Biodefense Expert, THE ATLANTIC, May 11, 2018, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2018/05/white-house-loses-global-health-security-lead-as-a-new-ebola-
outbreak-hits/560195/. 
94 See CSIS, CYCLE OF CRISIS, supra note 63, at 17; Tal Axelrod, Bolton Defends Decision to Shutter NSC Pandemic 
Office, THE HILL, Mar. 14, 2020, https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/487581-bolton-defends-decision-to-
shutter-nsc-pandemic-office. 
95 Glenn Kessler & Meg Kelly, Was the White House Office for Global Pandemics Eliminated?, WASH. POST, Mar. 
20, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/03/20/was-white-house-office-global-pandemics-
eliminated/. 
96 See CSIS, CYCLE OF CRISIS, supra note 63, at 17. 
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NSC.97 Some officials also justified the changes98 as an effort to “combine a handful of offices 
with similar mission sets.”99 One asserted (with no substantiation) that the combined directorate 
was an improvement because it would allow for the “commingling” of ostensibly related 
expertise.100 It has since become clear, however, that the decision to eliminate the pandemic 
Directorate had considerable downsides.  
The Trump Administration’s merger of the Obama Directorate into an entity with 
responsibilities relating to weapons of mass destruction and terrorist threats moved federal 
pandemic planning in the direction of greater federal centralization of authority to tackle a broad 
range of crisis management issues. This move to increase centralization needlessly sacrificed core 
benefits of decentralization, which include leveraging the expertise, diversity, and accountability 
advantages of decentralized authorities while maintaining coherent implementation. In contrast, 
combining epidemic prevention and response with managing matters relating to weapons of mass 
destruction and terrorism threats runs the risk of subordinating concerns about the risks associated 
with naturally spread diseases to preparation for intentional attacks.101 Indeed, some observers saw 
the dismantling of the Obama pandemic response Directorate as a signal that its work was not a 
priority of the Trump Administration.102 One expert referred to the Trump Administration’s 
“streamlining” of the NSC directorates as a “decapitation” and “dilution” of the White House’s 
prior focus on pandemic threats.103 
 
Others with experience or expertise on pandemic responses expressed similar concerns, 
concluding that the disbanding of the pandemic-specific unit within NSC was apt to hinder the 
United States’ response to COVID-19.104 In its 2019 report on Strengthening America’s Health 
Security, CSIS, a bipartisan, nonprofit policy research organization, identified as its first critical 
reform recommendation for strategic investment in pandemic prevention, protection and resilience 
the restoration of “health security leadership” at the NSC.105 Likewise, in February 2020, thirty 
members of the Senate wrote a letter to the Assistant to the President on National Affairs urging 
the President to fill the vacancy resulting from Admiral Ziemer’s departure. 
 
Perhaps the most revealing comment, however, came from Dr. Anthony Fauci, the Director 
of the National Institutes of Health’s National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, and one 
of the main faces of the Trump Administration’s COVID-19 response, at least until the President 
                                                          
97 Klain, supra note 64. 
98 Partly False Claim, supra note 92. 
99 Yong, supra note 93. 
100 Tim Morrison, No, the White House Didn’t ‘Dissolve’ Its Pandemic Response Office. I Was There., WASH. POST, 
Mar. 16, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/03/16/no-white-house-didnt-dissolve-its-pandemic-
response-office/. 
101 Cf. Hunter Knapp, Managing an Administrative Emergency: Establishing FEMA As an Independent Agency, 31 
COLO. NAT. RESOURCES, ENERGY & ENVTL L. REV. 231, 241 (2020) (arguing that movement of the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency into the Department of Homeland Security after 9/11 subordinated the role of natural 
disaster preparedness, which “proved costly when Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast in 2005”). 
102 Dozier & Bergengruen, supra note 4. 
103 Shesgreen, supra note 62. 
104 Laura Strickler & Ken Dilanian, Trump Cuts to National Security Staff May Hurt Coronavirus Response, Former 
Officials Say, NBCNEWS, Feb. 26, 2020, https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/trump-cuts-national-security-
staff-may-hurt-coronavirus-response-say-n1143656. 
105 CSIS, CYCLE OF CRISIS, supra note 63, at x, 17. 
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became disillusioned with his prominence and advice.106 Dr. Fauci admitted that “It would be nice 
if [the Obama Directorate disbanded by John Bolton] was still there.”107 The Trump 
Administration later implicitly acknowledged its mistake by initiating efforts to reestablish a 
dedicated pandemic response unit. It considered locating the unit at the State Department rather 
than the NSC, perhaps to reduce the perception that it understood it had erred in disbanding the 
Directorate in the first place and was simply reverting to the Obama Administration’s approach.108 
After his election, incoming President Biden’s transition team issued a Plan to Combat 
Coronavirus (COVID-19) that promised to “[i]mmediately restore the White House National 
Security Council Directorate for Global Health Security and Biodefense, which was established 
by the Obama-Biden Administration and eliminated by the Trump Administration in 2018.”109 
 
The diminished profile and responsibility of the NSC, which housed the consolidated 
directorate that emerged from John Bolton’s reorganization efforts, also took its toll. For example, 
NSC sponsored the first interagency meeting on the outbreak in mid-January 2020, which it 
followed up two weeks later with a meeting of the NSC deputies committee.110 Whatever 
recommendations emerged from those meetings seem to have gotten lost amid the many other 
voices speaking for the Administration and crafting its pandemic response policy.  
 
 2. Federal Abdication in Pandemic Response 
 
In a different sense, the Trump Administration’s approach was also more decentralized 
than the Obama Administration’s strategy: federal leadership of state and local government 
                                                          
106 See, e.g., Yasmeen Abutalenb et al., The Inside Story of How Trump’s Denial, Mismanagement and Magical 
Thinking Led to the Pandemic’s Dark Winter, WASH. POST (Dec. 19, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/politics/trump-covid-pandemic-dark-winter/ (noting that “[t]he 
president and some on his team were also increasingly frustrated with Fauci, who frequently appeared in the media 
offering what they viewed as an overly alarmist public health message”). 
107 Dozier & Bergengruen, supra note 4. 
108 See Kylie Atwood & Nicole Gaouette, Trump Administration Moves Ahead with Plan to Open New Pandemic 
Office as Coronavirus Crisis Intensifies, CNN, July 2, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/02/politics/trump-state-
dept-new-pandemic-office/index.html (“Former officials say the administration could have been better prepared for 
the pandemic if it had left the original office in place instead of trying to replicate it even as the virus gained new 
ground.”). Lisa Monaco, who, as President Obama’s National Security Adviser, oversaw the creation of the NSC’s 
directorate, explained that placing the unit within the NSC facilitated policy coordination across the entire government. 
She characterized the Trump Administration’s plan to reestablish the unit as “a recognition that you do indeed need a 
specific identified place to constantly be focusing on pandemic response,” but she feared that placing it in the State 
Department rather than under White House control would replicate the failure of the Trump HHS task force under 
Secretary Azar to achieve effective government-wide coordination. Id. See also Michael Igoe, Exclusive: State 
Department Makes Bid for U.S. Global Pandemic Response Powers, DEVEX, May 22, 202, 
https://www.devex.com/news/exclusive-state-department-makes-bid-for-us-global-pandemic-response-powers-
97315 (discussing proposed initiative, the President’s Response to Outbreaks, to be run by the State Department). 
109 The Biden Plan to Combat Coronavirus (COVID-19) and Prepare for Future Global Health Threats, 
https://joebiden.com/covid-plan/ [hereinafter Biden Plan]. Moreover, Biden chose Beth Cameron, who as head of the 
Directorate wrote the Obama Administration’s pandemic playbook, to return as the head of the restored Directorate. 
Karen DeYoung, Biden’s NSC to Focus on Global Health, Climate, Cyber and Human Rights, as Well as China and 
Russia, WASH. POST (Jan. 8, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/biden-nsc-covid-climate-
cyber-china/2021/01/08/85a31cba-5158-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html. 
110 See Josh Rogin, The National Security Council Sounded Early Alarms About the Coronavirus, WASH. POST, Mar. 
30, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/03/30/national-security-council-sounded-early-alarms-
about-coronavirus/. 
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pandemic response was sorely lacking.111 Some decentralization is necessary to deal with a 
pandemic that affects various parts of the country differently at different times.112 As the pandemic 
worsened, for example, state governors have been among the most important officials in crafting 
pandemic response policy.113 Decentralized authority leverages the expertise of state and local 
officials to respond in ways that meet local conditions and needs. It also allows these governments 
to experiment with different approaches, so that the more successful ones can be tried elsewhere.114  
 
Despite these advantages, however, decentralization is not necessarily desirable in all 
contexts and for all governmental functions. There is substantial evidence that the federal 
government during the Trump Administration abdicated, or at least neglected, its role in pandemic 
response, leading to a largely ineffective, decentralized effort. According to one observer, “[e]ven 
after containment was impossible, early adoption of a uniform federal plan that acknowledged the 
severity of the crisis and provided mitigation guidelines for state public-health officials and 
ordinary citizens might have lessened the virus’s impact.”115 Indeed, the President resisted using 
his authority under the Defense Production Act116 “to spur additional production of scarce medical 
supplies and centralized their procurement and distribution.”117 Federal acquisition of medical 
supplies could have taken advantage of economies of scale and ensured distribution according to 
                                                          
111 See Berman, supra note 65, at 79: 
Presidential statements disclaiming responsibility for coordinating a national effort to secure needed supplies 
and testing capacity, encouraging citizens to defy local stay-at-home orders, and encouraging governors to 
defy the White House’s own guidelines regarding when mitigation measures could be eased left the clear 
impression that the President had no interest in bringing the federal government’s powers to bear in executing 
the basic blocking and tackling needed for a successful response. 
112 See, e.g., Gable, supra note 32, at 435 (urging adoption of “an integrated pluralistic governance approach” to public 
health emergencies to create “a more robust and resilient public health emergency response system”). Moreover, the 
legality of a hierarchical federal response system is unclear. For example, the scope of the federal government’s 
authority to issue a nationwide quarantine order than binds the states is uncertain. Compare See Maryam Jamshidi, 
The Federal Government Probably Can’t Order Statewide Quarantines, 4/20/2020 U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE 1 (2020) 
(asserting that the federal government lacks such authority) with 42 U.S.C. § 264(a) (authorizing the Surgeon General 
“to make and enforce such regulations as in his judgment are necessary to prevent the introduction, transmission, or 
spread of communicable diseases from foreign countries into the States or possessions, or from one State or possession 
into any other State or possession”). For arguments in favor of enhanced federal authority to require social distancing 
and mask wearing, see Lindsay F. Wiley, Democratizing the Law of Social Distancing, 19 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. 
& ETHICS 50 (2020). 
113 See, e.g., Kristina Sgueglia, Cheri Mossburg & Maeve Reston, Governors on East and West Coasts Form Pacts to 
Decide When to Reopen Economies, CNN, Apr. 13, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/13/politics/states-band-
together-reopening-plans/index.html (reporting that governors of states on both coasts engaged in coordinated 
planning to re-open economies in ways that limit new outbreaks of coronavirus). Cf. Eang L. Ngov, Under 
Containment: Preempting State Ebola Quarantine Regulations, 88 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 28-29 (2015) (describing reasons 
identified by investigators following an outbreak of cholera in New York for the development of a uniform federal 
quarantine system). 
114 See CAMACHO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 13, at 34-35 (identifying these advantages of decentralized allocations 
of authority). 
115 Berman, supra note 65, at 79.  
116 Defense Production Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. §§ 4511-4518. 
117 Berman, supra note 65, at 80; see also Caroline Hopkins, “We Are Desperate”: Trump’s Inaction Has Created a 
Crisis with Protective Medical Gear, VOX (Mar. 23, 2020),  https://www.vox.com/2020/3/22/21189896/coronavirus-
in-us-masks-n95-respirator-doctors-nurses-shortage-ppe. 
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need.118 The Trump Administration  also refused to take charge of testing and contact tracing 
efforts that could have slowed the spread of the virus.119 It declined to make sure that clear and 
accurate information about the virus was available to all.120 In all these respects, the Administration 
was content to leave the bulk of planning and response responsibility to lower levels of government 
and to the private sector. 
 
The same unwillingness to lead the response effort surfaced in the distribution of 
coronavirus vaccines late in 2020. According to public health officials, “federal officials have left 
many of the details of the final stage of the vaccine distribution process, such as scheduling and 
staffing, to overstretched local health officials and hospitals.”121 President Trump himself tweeted 
that it was “up to the States to distribute the vaccines once brought to the designated areas by the 
Federal Government,”122 leading the dean of Brown University’s School of Public Health to 
remark that “[w]e’ve taken the people with the least amount of capacity and asked them to do the 
hardest part of the vaccination – which is actually getting the vaccines administered into people’s 
arms.”123 He also charged that, “[u]timately, the buck stops with no one.”124 The Administration’s 
                                                          
118 Ed Yong, How the Pandemic Defeated America, ATLANTIC (Aug. 4, 2020), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/09/coronavirus-american-failure/614191/ [hereinafter Yong, 
Defeated]. 
119 Berman, supra note 65, at 81; cf. id. At 82 (bemoaning the absence of a “comprehensive national plan for assessing 
the need for and distributing [personal protective equipment] and other supplies or for developing the surveillance and 
testing capacities that experts insist are needed to keep the virus under control”); see also Rachel Weiner, Trump 
Administration’s Approach to Testing is Chaotic and Unhelpful, States Say, WASH. POST (July 9, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/trump-administrations-approach-to-testing-is-chaotic-and-unhelpful-states-
say/2020/07/09/66a4b08a-c1e8-11ea-b4f6-cb39cd8940fb_story.html (repeating criticisms by Democratic leaders that 
“[t]he Trump Administration’s erratic approach to testing for the novel coronavirus has left state leaders and 
commercial laboratories confused, frustrated, and unprepared . . .”). 
120 Yong, Defeated, supra note 118. For example, the White House Coronavirus Task Force informed the states after 
the 2020 presidential election that it would stop sending weekly reports to the states with current information on the 
incidence of the virus and recommendations on how to respond to it, notwithstanding the explosion of new cases that 
were spurred by the virus’s second wave. Betsy Klein, White House Coronavirus Task Force No Longer Proactively 
Sending to the States, CNN POLITICS (Dec. 23, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/12/23/politics/white-house-
coronavirus-state-reports/index.html. Earlier, the White House had ordered federal health officials to treat the Task 
Force’s meetings as classified, which, according to some of the Trump Administration’s own officials, “restricted 
information and hampered the U.S. government’s response to the contagion.” Aram Roston & Marisa Taylor, White 
House Told Federal Health Agency to Classify Coronavirus Deliberations – Sources, REUTERS (Mar. 11, 2020), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-secrecy-exclusive/exclusive-white-house-told-federal-health-
agency-to-classify-coronavirus-deliberations-sources-idUSKBN20Y2LM. 
121 Rebeca Robbins, Frances Robles & Tim Arango, Here’s Why Distribution of the Vaccine Is Taking Longer Than 




124 Id. See also id. (reporting that Maryland Governor Larry Hogan attributed the slow vaccination process to “the 
federal government not sending as many doses as initially predicted” and to “the lack of logistical and financial support 
for local; health departments”); Rebecca Robbins, Frances Robles & Tim Arango, Vaccinations Lag as States Tackle 
Logistical Woes, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2021), https://static01.nyt.com/images/2021/01/01/nytfrontpage/scan.pdf 
(reporting that Vice-President Pence stated at a press briefing that “‘decision making at the local level’ was key, 
continuing a long pattern of the administration seeking to push responsibility to the states”) [hereinafter Robbins et 
al., Logistical Woes]. 
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“hands off” approach sacrificed the uniformity, economies of scale, and resource pooling 
advantages that centralized pandemic response authority might have been capable of providing.125 
 
B. Overlapping and Unaccountable Authority 
Like each polar end of the three dimensions of authority, overlapping authority has the 
potential to provide advantages that include enhanced programmatic effectiveness through the 
creation of a safety net against inaction and greater resistance to agency capture.126 The experience 
of federal authority over pandemic planning highlights some of these key benefits. However, 
overlap is not always advantageous, in that it can impair accountability and create conflicting 
mandates or advice.127 Existing federal authority over public health emergency response activities 
illustrates key problems with such an allocation.  
 
 1. Overlap in Federal Pandemic Planning 
 
There was significant overlap in planning authority before the pandemic, both among 
federal agencies and between the federal government and state governments. Various federal 
statutes assign planning roles concerning public health emergencies to a host of federal officials. 
The Disaster Relief Act Amendments of 1974 authorizes the President to establish a program of 
disaster preparedness, including preparation of disaster preparedness plans.128 The statute also 
directs the President to establish a federal interagency task force to coordinate implementation of 
“predisaster hazard mitigation programs administered by the Federal government.”129 As noted 
above,130 PAPHA delegated to the Secretary of HHS the responsibility of preparing once every 
four years a National Health Security Strategy for public health preparedness and response.131 It 
also required the HHS Secretary to establish an interagency agreement with four specified cabinet 
secretaries and “the head of any other relevant Federal agency” that would govern HHS’s distinct 
operational control of emergency public health and medical response assets in the event of a public 
health emergency.132 In the same year as it adopted PAPHA, Congress included in the Department 
of Homeland Security Appropriations Act a requirement that the Administrator of  the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) “provide Federal leadership necessary to prepare for, 
protect against, respond to, recover from, or mitigate against a natural disaster.”133 The National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 directed the Secretaries of Defense, HHS, 
                                                          
125 See CAMACHO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 13, at 35-37. 
126 See id. at 50. 
127 See id.. 
128 42 U.S.C. § 5131(a). For a list of the presidential directives, federal statutes, and treaties relating to biodefense 
matters as of 2015, see BIPARTISAN COMMISSION ON BIODEFENSE, BLUE RIBBON STUDY PANEL ON BIODEFENSE, A 
NATIONAL BLUEPRINT FOR BIODEFENSE: LEADERSHIP AND MAJOR REFORM NEEDED TO OPTIMIZE EFFORTS 14 (Oct. 
28, 2015), https://biodefensecommission.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/NationalBluePrintNov2018-03.pdf 
[hereinafter BLUEPRINT FOR BIODEFENSE]. One of the panel’s recommendations was to create a Biodefense 
Coordination Council at the White House “to create cohesion among departments, agencies, states, localities, 
territories, tribes, and industry.” Id. at 12. The creation of the Obama Directorate within the NSC in 2016 essentially 
implemented that recommendation. 
129 Id. § 5134(a). 
130 See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
131 42 U.S.C. § 300hh-1(a)(1). 
132 Id. § 300hh(b). 
133 Pub. L. No. 109-295, § 611(12), 120 Stat. 1355, 1398 (2007) (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 314(a)). 
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Homeland Security and Agriculture to jointly develop a national biodefense strategy and 
associated implementation plan” that, among other things, describes the roles of federal agencies 
in protecting against biodefense threats, including naturally occurring biological outbreaks.134 In 
addition, all of these statutes require integration of federal planning mechanisms with state and 
local public health planning authorities.135 None, however, specifies whether the jointly developed 
plans or strategies should assign distinct roles to the participating agencies or should reflect the 
exercise of overlapping implementation responsibilities. In other words, the planning itself is 
designed to involve overlapping authority, but the statute appears to leave to the discretion of the 
planning entities whether implementation should also reflect overlapping authority or instead 
should assign distinct duties. 
 
These statutory directives generated a host of federal plans for managing public health 
emergencies such as viral pandemics. In 2005 and 2006, for example, the White House Homeland 
Security Council issued pandemic influenza plans.136 The 2005 Strategy identified leadership roles 
for particular federal agencies, but by calling them lead agencies, the plans contemplated that other 
federal (and state) agencies would engage in some of the same activities.137 Likewise, the 2006 
Implementation Plan specified different coordinating roles for eight cabinet secretaries. Some of 
those roles involved coordinating federal with state, local, and tribal action.138 Others seemed to 
involve distinct federal coordination of private sector activities.139 In 2007, CDC issued planning 
guidance on strategies for pandemic mitigation by state, territorial, tribal, and local communities, 
but the plan indicated that it was the joint work product of HHS and “other Federal agencies.”140 
HHS issued a pandemic influenza plan in 2017, updating a similar plan adopted in 2009.141 That 
plan stated that it “builds a vision with many partners,” including state and local governments and 
other federal agencies.142 HHS’s Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response issued a 
                                                          
134 6 U.S.C. § 104(a)-(b).  
135 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300hh-1(b)(A) (concerning evaluation of federal, state, local, and tribal preparedness and 
response capabilities through drills and exercises); id. § 300hh-1(b)(2) (requiring that the National Health Security 
Strategy develop and sustain federal, state, local, and tribal essential public health security capabilities); id. § 300hh-
1(b)(9) (requiring that this Strategy improve coordination among federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial authorities 
to prevent, detect, and respond to disease outbreaks); 42 U.S.C. § 5131(a)(5) (directing the President to include in a 
program of disaster preparedness coordinated federal, state, and local preparedness programs). 
136 HOMELAND SECURITY COUNCIL, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA (2005), 
https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/pdf/pandemic-influenza-strategy-2005.pdf [hereinafter HSC Strategy]; 
HOMELAND SECURITY COUNCIL, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA IMPLEMENTATION PLAN (2006), 
https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/pdf/pandemic-influenza-implementation.pdf [hereinafter HSC, 
Implementation Plan]. 
137 See HSC Strategy, supra note 136, at 10 (specifying that HHS would be the lead agency for medical response and 
that DHS would be the lead agency for “overall domestic incident management and federal coordination). 
138 HSC, Implementation Plan, supra note 136, at 29 (HHS Secretary). 
139 Id. at 30 (Secretary of Agriculture). 
140 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, INTERIM PRE-PANDEMIC PLANNING GUIDANCE: COMMUNITY STRATEGY FOR 
PANDEMIC INFLUENZA MITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES—EARLY, TARGETED, LAYERED USE OF 
NONPHARMACEUTICAL INTERVENTIONS 7 (2007), https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-
resources/pdf/community_mitigation-sm.pdf?fbclid=IwAR0DiNfCTdB5alhJaOq3VtxhfymddjvDBCjJG7QPM55-
nZ3YHNbAFYT1wio [hereinafter CDC, INTERIM GUIDANCE]. 
141 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PLAN, 2017 UPDATE, 
https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/pdf/pan-flu-report-2017v2.pdf. 
142 Id. at 14. 
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national health security strategy and implementation plan covering 2015-2018.143 Finally, HHS 
issued its COVID-19 plan at the cusp of planning and response at the inception of the viral outbreak 
in early 2020.144 It, too, indicated that the plan “was developed through the sustained involvement 
of a broad array of stakeholders, including agencies and organizations from across the federal 
government, as well as representatives from the private sector, state and local governments, the 
nonprofit sector, community-based organizations, and the scientific and academic community.”145 
 
The federal pandemic statutes thus largely anticipated overlapping and collaborative efforts 
by multiple federal agencies to develop pandemic preparedness plans, often with one agency, such 
as HHS, taking on a coordinating role. The plans adopted pursuant to these statutes were all jointly 
developed. This approach is sensible because it allows input by stakeholders, including federal 
agencies other than the lead coordinating agency, that will play a role in implementing plans and 
engaging in response actions. At the same time, the designation of a lead agency can help minimize 
conflicting directives and avoid duplication of effort by assigning specific but distinct tasks to the 
participating agencies. As the next section indicates, the Trump Administration’s response to 
COVID-19 involved considerable overlapping authority, which in  many respects was problematic. 
 
 2. Overlap in Federal Pandemic Response 
 
Overlapping authority characterized not only the planning that occurred in anticipation of 
a public health emergency such as COVID-19, but also in the response that occurred in the wake 
of the outbreak. The substantial overlap in federal authority that characterized the Trump 
Administration’s pandemic response led to significant inefficiencies, inter-jurisdictional 
conflict, inaction, and inconsistent action when it occurred.  
 
Almost from the virus’s arrival in the United States, it was unclear who was supposed to 
be in charge of directing planning and how to respond to and implementing those plans.146 The 
White House created its Coronavirus Task Force on January 27, 2020.147 At first, HHS Secretary 
Azar led the Task Force and was in charge of developing the government’s pandemic response, 
although the NSC also had coordinating role.148 On February 28, 2020, however, Vice-President 
Mike Pence took over leadership of the Task Force,149 assuming the role of the administration’s 
virus “czar.” Not long after that appointment, however, Trump handed over authority to develop 
and implement at least some aspects of the federal response to the coronavirus to his son-in-law, 
                                                          
143 ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AND 
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN: 2015-2018, https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/planning/authority/nhss/Documents/nhss-
ip.pdf. 
144 See PANCAP, supra note 25. 
145 Id. at v. 
146 See Toluse Olorunnipa, Josh Dawsey & Yasmeen Abutaleb, With Trump Leading the Way, America’s Cornoavirus 
Failures Exposed by Record Surge in New Infections, WASH. POST, June 27, 2020, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/with-trump-leading-the-way-americas-coronavirus-failures-exposed-by-
record-surge-in-new-infections/2020/06/27/bd15aea2-b7c4-11ea-a8da-693df3d7674a_story.html (stating that “the 
President’s top aides and senior administration officials . . . contradict one another on a daily basis”). 
147 GAO-20, 265, supra note 25, at 89. 
148 PANCAP, supra note 25, at 8; see also GAO-20-265, supra note 25, at 12 (“The National Security Council also 
provides guidance to the White House Coronavirus Task Force on matters of policy. 
149 PANCAP, supra note 25, at 8. 
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Jared Kushner, who operated a “shadow” pandemic response program.150 Neither the Vice-
President nor Mr. Kushner had any relevant disease-related expertise.151 Working out of FEMA, 
Kushner displaced HHS, which under PAPHA should have been the lead federal agency,152 as the 
locus of the federal government’s management of the pandemic.153 Kushner’s emergency as a 
leader of the response further obscured the hierarchy of decisionmaking authority among Azar, 
Pence, and Kushner.154 The resulting confusion ran counter to the Administration’s March 2020 
COVID plan, which purported to “identif[y] anticipated roles and responsibilities of HHS, other 
federal departments and agencies, and supporting organizations, to establish lines of authority and 
avoid overlap and duplication of effort.”155 
 
The shifting leadership of the administration’s COVID response, and the absence of clearly 
delineated lines of authority, reflected President Trump’s general tolerance for, and at times 
encouragement of, the creation of conflicting power centers among his subordinates. In this 
instance, the result was “policy paralysis, confusion about who was in charge and a lack of a clear, 
consistent message about how to reduce the risks from the pandemic.”156 According to the 
Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration for the first two years of President Trump’s 
term, “Someone needed to pull [the response] together. . . . That didn’t happen on testing and a 
whole lot of other things.”157 
 
The lack of clear and consistent signals from the overlapping federal response authorities 
plagued various aspects of the response. For example, HHS posted guidelines informing 
individuals who were exposed to the coronavirus but were asymptomatic that they did not need to 
get tested on CDC’s website without CDC’s input or approval and over the objection of some of 
its scientists.158 Similarly, HHS prepared and posted guidance on the importance of opening 
schools on CDC’s website,159 and HHS revised CDC’s Morbidity and Mortality Weekly 
                                                          
150 Bess Levin, So Jared Kushner Is Running a “Shadow” Coronavirus Task Force, VANITY FAIR, Mar. 19, 2020, 
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2020/03/jared-kushner-shadow-coronavirus-task-force. 
151 Michelle Goldberg, Putting Jared Kushner in Charge is Utter Madness, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2020, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/02/opinion/jared-kushner-coronavirus.html); Olorunnipa, Dawsey & Abutaleb, 
supra note 146 (“Others without a background in public health, including Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, have 
played an outsize role in guiding the federal response.”). Cf. Klarman, supra note 3, at 101 (“Yet at least in part 
because of President Trump’s disdain for expertise and the Republican Party’s general contempt for government, the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Veterans Affairs confronted the nation’s largest 
public health crisis in a century with vacant positions, acting officials, and a lack of experts.”). 
152 See PANCAP, supra note 25, at 1. 
153 Adam Cancryn & Dan Diamond, Behind the Scenes, Kushner Takes Charge of Coronavirus Response, POLITICO, 
Apr. 1, 2020, https://www.politico.com/news/2020/04/01/jared-kushner-coronavirus-response-160553?cid=apn. 
154 See id. (reporting that Kushner recruited the head of Medicare’s innovation center “to organize and manage key 
projects—bypassing the bureaucratic structures and internal rivalries that slowed progress in the response’s early 
months”); cf. Tom McCarthy, Jared Kushner and His Shadow Corona Unit: What Is Trump’s Son-in-Law Up To?, 
THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 5, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/05/jared-kushner-coronavirus-aid-
trump-governors (“The precise dimensions of Kushner’s emergency response role are difficult to pin down because 
his authority, which stems from his marriage, exists outside the mapped structure of government agencies. He seems 
to be inventing his role on the fly, and to have the power to do so.”). 
155 PAN CAP, supra note 25, at 1. 
156 Robbins et al., Logistical Woes, supra note 124. 
157 Id. 
158 See Apoorva Mandavilli, C.D.C. Testing Guidance Was Published Against Scientists’ Objections, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/17/health/coronavirus-testing-cdc.html. 
159 Id. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3770368
DRAFT: Jan. 20, 2021 




Reports.160 Senior public health officials charged that this inter-agency “meddling . . . was turning 
widely followed and otherwise apolitical guidance on infectious disease . . . into a political loyalty 
test, with career scientists [at CDC and elsewhere] framed as adversaries of the administration.”161 
An acting director of CDC during the Obama Administration remarked that “[t]he idea that 
someone at H.H.S. would write guidelines and have it posted under the C.D.C. banner is absolutely 
chilling.”162 CDC also posted and then, apparently at the behest of the White House,163 removed 
guidance indicating that the extent to which the virus is spread by airborne transmission is greater 
than previously believed. According to public health experts, such changes had the potential to 
shift policy over matters such as whether live classroom instruction was safe.164 The dissemination 
of conflicting information about matters such as the incidence of cases impaired the ability of 
states, localities, and medical facilities to respond to the virus, such as by directing medical 
supplies to areas most likely to need them and making decisions about which facilities to open or 
close to public access. 
 
C.  Uncoordinated Pandemic Planning and Response Efforts 
The Trump Administration’s organizational failures were perhaps most acute along the 
coordination-independence dimension. The Ebola outbreak crystallized the importance of inter-
governmental coordination in both pandemic planning and response,165 and subsequent planning 
under the Obama and Trump administrations signified awareness of the value of such coordination. 
Yet those lessons were lost on the Trump Administration, which could and should have been better 
organized and prepared to combat public health and safety emergencies. As things turned out, 
coordination failures at both the planning and response stages had devastating public health 
impacts.166 
                                                          
160 Noah Weiland, Sheryl Gay Stolberg and Abby Goodnough, Political Appointees Meddled in C.D.C.’s ‘Holiest of 
the Holy’ Health Reports, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2020, updated Sept. 18, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/12/us/politics/trump-coronavirus-politics-cdc.html 
161 Id. 
162 Mandavilli, supra note 158. 
163 Matt Stieb, CDC Reverses on COVID-19 Airborne Transmission, Says Guidelines Were ‘Posted in Error,’ N.Y. 
MAG., THE INTELLIGENCER (Sept. 21, 2020), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/09/cdc-reverses-covid-
transmission-guidelines-posted-in-error.html (“Throughout the pandemic, pressured by the current administration to 
release politically friendly information and frustrated by the challenges of a novel virus, the CDC has reversed an 
alarming number of recommendations.”). 
164 See Tim Elfrink, Ben Guarino & Chris Mooney, CDC Reverses Itself and Says Guidelines It Posted on Coronavirus 
Airborne Transmission Were Wrong, WASH. POST (Sept. 21, 2020). 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/09/21/cdc-covid-aerosols-airborne-guidelines/. 
165 See, e.g., Rothstein, supra note 22, at 279 (“In the United States, due to its complex and decentralized public health 
system, communication, coordination, calm, and proportionate response quickly emerged as leading concerns when a 
few Ebola cases were diagnosed and treated.”); James J. Misrahi, The CDC’s Communicable Disease Regulations: 
Striking the Balance Between Public Health & Individual Rights, 67 EMORY L.J. 463, 475 (2018) (“One of the lessons 
learned from the 2014-2016 Ebola epidemic was the need for a federal mechanism, in coordination with state and 
local public health authorities, to allow for the controlled movement of individuals in need of further public health 
monitoring, particularly regarding healthcare workers desiring to return to their home states of residence from Ebola-
affected countries.”); Dr. Andra le Roux-Kemp, International and Operational Responses to Disease Control: Beyond 
Ebola and Epistemological Confines, 15 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 247, 267 (2018) (stating that “the international response 
and coordination was found to be wholly inadequate and lacking” to deal with the Ebola outbreak). 
166 See Yasmeen Abutaleb et al., The U.S. Was Beset by Denial and Dysfunction as the Coronavirus Raged, WASH. 
POST, Apr. 4, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2020/04/04/coronavirus-government-
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  1.  Uncoordinated Pandemic Planning 
 
Some public policy problems are not well suited to “seat-of-the-pants” decisionmaking, 
requiring instead a coordinated plan of attack.167 To many, perhaps, it might seem obvious that 
pandemic planning would be one such problem, as previous presidential administrations had 
recognized. The federal statutes that govern planning for public healthy emergencies are littered 
with mandates to various federal officials to coordinate with each other; with state, local, and tribal 
officials; and with private stakeholders such as hospitals. The Disaster Relief Act of 1974, for 
example, authorizes the President to include in the federal government’s program of disaster 
preparedness “coordination of Federal, State, and local preparedness programs.”168 As noted 
above,169 the statute also directs the President to establish a federal interagency task force to 
coordinate implementation of “predisaster hazard mitigation programs administered by the Federal 
government.”170 PAPHA requires HHS to prepare “a coordinated” National Health Security 
Strategy171 whose preparedness goals include “[m]inimizing duplication of, and ensuring 
coordination between, Federal, State, local, and tribal planning [and preparedness. . . .”172 The 
Strategy also must seek to “[i]mprov[e] coordination among Federal, State, local, Tribal, and 
territorial entities . . . to prevent, detect, and respond to outbreaks” of zoonotic diseases.173 HHS’s 
ASPR, a position created by PAPHA, must “[c]oordinate with relevant Federal officials to ensure 
integration of Federal preparedness and response activities for public health emergencies,”174and 
“[p]rovide integrated policy coordination and strategic direction, before, during, and following 
public health emergencies. . . .”175 The national biodefense strategy and associated implementation 
plan required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 must include “[a] 
description of the roles and responsibilities of Executive agencies, including internal and external 
coordination procedures” in warning about and protection against naturally occurring biological 
outbreaks.176 
 
Federal executive branch officials, up to and including various presidents, also emphasized 
the importance of coordination in pandemic planning. President George W. Bush issued a directive 
making the DHS Secretary responsible “for coordinating Federal operations within the United 
                                                          
dysfunction/?arc404=true. For a list of government entities that, prior to the COVID-19 outbreak, had developed 
“emergency-response plans to guide pandemic response should the need arise,” see Berman, supra note 65, at 64.  
167 See Paul R. Schulman, Nonincremental Policy Making: Notes Toward and Alternative Paradigm, 69 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 1354 (1975). Tony Arnold put it this way: 
Without some process of planning, Charles Lindblom’s “science of muddling through” – the public-policy 
and public-administration foundation of adaptive management – becomes “the science of drifting along.” We 
run the risk of having no goals or sense of direction, no go-to plans ready to use when contingencies arise, 
no long-term investment of resources in conservation, no proactive efforts, and no agreed-upon criteria, 
values, and processes for evaluating possible alternative courses of action. 
Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Adaptive Watershed Planning and Climate Change, 5 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y 
J. 417, 421 (2010). 
168 42 U.S.C. § 5131(a)(5). 
169 See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text. 
170 42 U.S.C. § 5134. 
171 42 U.S.C. § 300hh-1(a)(1). 
172 Id. § 300hh-1(b)(5). 
173 Id. § 300hh-1(b)(9). 
174 Id. § 300hh-10(b)(4)(A). 
175 Id. § 300hh-10(b)(4)(D). 
176 6 U.S.C. § 104(b)(4). 
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States to prepare for, respond to, and recover from” major disasters and other emergencies.177 
President Obama’s executive order to implement the GHSA spurred by the Ebola virus directed 
“each executive department, agency, and office (agency) . . . , as appropriate, [to] partner, consult, 
and coordinate with other governments” and nongovernmental stakeholders, including the private 
sector.”178 
 
In the same vein, under the leadership of Ron Klain, in his role as the White House Ebola 
response coordinator, the Obama Administration prepared a plan to deal with future infectious 
disease threats, specifically including novel coronaviruses.179 The plan’s objective was to assist 
government officials “in coordinating a complex U.S. Government response to a high-consequence 
emerging disease threat anywhere in the word.”180 During the transition to the Trump 
Administration, outgoing Obama Administration officials briefed the new Administration on the 
existence of the plan and conducted tabletop exercises to help plan for a pandemic-like situation.181  
 
Before the outbreak of the coronavirus, public health experts had warned for months of the 
consequences of poor organizational choices, including the absence of coordinated planning under 
the leadership of empowered federal officials. A report issued by the bipartisan Center for Strategic 
& International Studies Commission182 on Strengthening America’s Health in 2019 recommended 
a restoration of the dedicated pandemic response Directorate within the NSC. The report urged the 
U.S. government to: 
 
re-establish a directorate for global health security and biodefense on the National Security 
Council (NSC) staff and . . . name a senior-level leader in charge of coordinating U.S. 
efforts to anticipate, prevent, and respond to biological crises. These actions will ensure 
that the necessary leadership, authority, and accountability is in place to protect the United 
States from a deadly and costly health security emergency.183 
 
The report added that, as things then stood, “critical leadership gaps remain. It remains unclear 
who would be in charge at the White House in the case of a grave pandemic threat or cross-border 
biological crisis, whether natural, accidental, or deliberate.”184 It claimed that a re-established 
health security and biodefense Directorate within the NSC could not only facilitate planning for 
crises such as viral outbreaks, but also promote efficient responses, strengthened accountability, 
and better spending of scarce resources when an outbreak occurred.185 
 
                                                          
177 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD- 5), Management of Domestic Incidents ¶ 4 (2003), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Homeland%20Security%20Presidential%20Directive%205.pdf. 
178 Exec. Order No. 13747, Advancing the Global Health Security Agenda to Achieve a World Safe and Secure From 
Infectious Disease Threats, § 1, 81 Fed. Reg. 78701 (Nov. 9, 2016). 
179 PLAYBOOK, supra note 70. On Klain’s role in preparing the Playbook, see Victoria Knight, Evidence Shows Obama 
Team Left A Pandemic ‘Game Plan’ For Trump Administration, KHN (May 15, 2020), https://khn.org/news/evidence-
shows-obama-team-left-a-pandemic-game-plan-for-trump-administration/. 
180 PLAYBOOK, supra note 70, at 4. 
181 Knight, supra note 179. 
182 For a description of the CSIS, see supra note 63. 
183 CSIS, CYCLE OF CRISIS, supra note 63, at 17. 
183 ENDING THE CYCLE, supra note 92, at 17. 
184 Id. at 18. 
185 Id. 
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At least initially, the Trump Administration implicitly seemed to recognize the need for 
coordinated leadership by an empowered federal agency. At a Biodefense Summit hosted by HHS 
in April 2019, Secretary Alex Azar expressed his concern about a pandemic flu and enunciated “a 
cardinal rule of leadership that you have to have accountability, which means picking a leader . . . 
who has a particular interest not just in our national security, but in preparedness for biodefense in 
particular.”186  Yet, when COVID-19 began spiraling out of control, congressional leaders such as 
Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell denied the existence of any previously prepared 
pandemic “game plan,” while the Trump Administration’s press secretary, while acknowledging 
the existence of the Obama Playbook, dismissed it as useless.187 As a result, the Obama plan’s 
“detailed exact steps to take in the event of an infectious disease outbreak” were largely if not 
entirely ignored.188 
 
Even if the Trump Administration doubted the utility of the Obama Playbook, it had the 
opportunity to engage in its own pandemic planning. After all, the Administration took office in 
January 2017 and COVID-19 did not surface in the United States until early 2020. Between 
January and August 2019, HHS actually ran a simulated exercise, called “Crimson Contagion,”189 
to test the nation’s readiness to deal with a pandemic. The simulation involved U.S. tourists 
returning home after a visit to China with a respiratory virus. The take-aways from the simulation 
included findings that federal funding sources were insufficient, there was confusion about how to 
apply the Defense Production Act, there was a lack of clarity on the roles of different federal 
agencies, confusion existed between HHS, FEMA, and the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) on which federal agency would take the lead in the event of a crisis, the relevant federal 
agencies used disparate information management systems, and federal-state information sharing 
nodes were unclear.190 The draft report issued at the conclusion of the simulation exercise 
concluded: 
 
further examination is needed to determine how federal interagency partners will 
coordinate with one another on a variety of pandemic influenza-specific response activities, 
including but not limited to information-sharing with the National Security Council, 
addressing shortages in medical countermeasure and ancillary supplies, bilateral state-
federal request for information coordination nodes and processes, and the respective roles 
and responsibilities of HHS and DHS/FEMA in response to a complex and unique threat, 
with a nontraditional lead federal agency.191 
 
The 2019 simulation exercise “drove home just how underfunded, underprepared and 
uncoordinated the federal government would be for a life-or-death battle with a virus for which no 
                                                          
186 Andrew Kaczynski & Em Steck, Top Administration Officials Said Last Year Threat of Pandemic Kept Them Up 




189 See Crimson Contagion 2019 Functional Exercise Key Findings, https://int.nyt.com/data/documenthelper/6824-
2019-10-key-findings-and-after/05bd797500ea55be0724/optimized/full.pdf#page=1 [hereinafter Crimson 
Contagion]. 
190 Id. at 18, 21, 25, 31, 35, 39; Carol Marin & Don Moseley, ‘Crimson Contagion 2019' Simulation Warned of 
Pandemic Implications in US, NBC5CHICAGO (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.nbcchicago.com/news/local/crimson-
contagion-2019-simulation-warned-of-pandemic-implications-in-us/2243832/. 
191 Crimson Contagion, supra note 189, at 46. 
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treatment existed.”192 Whatever follow-up planning, if any, that may have occurred, however, did 
not adequately address these shortcomings, and the lack of coordination highlighted by the 
planning exercise plagued the eventual response. President Trump asserted by way of justification 
that “nobody knew there would be a pandemic . . . of this proportion,” when in fact the simulation 
exercise had predicted exactly that.193 
 
 Other past and present federal officials took issue with the Trump Administration’s 
apparent lack of interest in rigorous pandemic planning and its planning-related organizational 
choices, and in particular with the elimination of the Global Health Security and Biodefense 
Directorate as a separate entity.  Senator Diane Feinstein sent a letter to Secretary Azar in January 
2020 asking him to increase preparedness and reinstate the Obama Directorate.194 At about the 
same time, Ron Klain, who headed the Directorate before Beth Cameron, opposed the Trump 
Administration’s decision to merge it into an NSC body with a broader and more disparate 
jurisdiction. Klain asserted that “with no one in charge at the White House, there is no authority to 
resolve disputes between federal agencies; no one to hold agencies accountable for the pace and 
intensity with which they implement the response; no one to resolve competing requests for 
congressional funding; and no one to draw on the resources of the security agencies of the 
government to help support the response.”195  
 
The absence of coordinated federal leadership made it virtually impossible to make any 
individual or agency accountable, especially in the face of President Trump’s refusal to take any 
responsibility for anything the government did or did not do in facing the virus.196 As one scholar 
has noted, “[a]nyone who has considered pandemic preparedness has emphasized the need for a 
‘single, comprehensive, and harmonized strategy’ orchestrated by a ‘single leader to control, 
prioritize, coordinate, and hold agencies accountable.’”197 
                                                          
192 David E. Sanger et al., Before Virus Outbreak, a Cascade of Warnings Went Unheeded, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 
2020, updated Mar. 22, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/19/us/politics/trump-coronavirus-outbreak.html. 
193 Mary Papenfuss, Trump Administration Failed Dry Run ‘Crimson Contagion’ Pandemic Exercise, HUFFPOST 
(Mar. 20, 2020), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/crimson-contagion-exercise-trump-administration-
failures_n_5e744105c5b6eab7794560e6). 
194 Dana Milbank, Republicans Were Warned. Yet They Persisted in Defending Trump., WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 2020, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/04/01/republicans-were-warned-yet-they-persisted-enabling-
trumps-coronavirus-debacle/. 
195 Klain, supra note 64. According to one source, more than 50 federal executive branch political appointees had 
some responsibility for biodefense matters as of 2015, “but [they] largely act independently.” BLUEPRINT FOR 
BIODEFENSE supra note 128, at 12. 
196 Caitlin Oprysko, 'I Don't Take Responsibility at All': Trump Deflects Blame for Coronavirus Testing Fumble, 
POLITICO, Mar. 13, 2020, https://www.politico.com/news/2020/03/13/trump-coronavirus-testing-128971. Others have 
suggested different ways to foster accountability, such as transforming executive branch public health agencies into 
independent agencies in the traditional administrative law meaning of that term (i.e., agencies that are typically headed 
by bipartisan multi-member boards or commissions whose members are removable by the President only for cause). 
See, e.g., Eric E. Johnson & Theodore C. Bailey, Urgent Legal Lessons from a Very Fast Problem: Covid-19, 73 
STAN. L. REV. ONLINE (2020), https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/legal-lessons-from-a-very-fast-problem-
covid-19/ (arguing that “[w]e could refashion the [U.S. Public Health Service] on the model of independent agencies 
such as the Federal Reserve Board” to shield its decisions from political influence). 
197 Berman, supra note 65, at 78 (quoting BLUEPRINT FOR BIODEFENSE supra note 128, at iv). The Panel asserted in 
its 2015 report that “federal biodefense activities are insufficiently coordinated. Authority and responsibilities are 
dispersed among many cabinet agencies, without the benefit of a single leader to provide directives and receive reports. 
Thus, while outcomes of individual department and agency efforts may or not be successful, no one is held fully 
accountable for the necessary outcomes of a mission-oriented and integrated biodefense enterprise.” Id. at 11. 
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 2.  Uncoordinated Pandemic Response 
 
These deficiencies in planning coordination considerably impaired the Administration’s 
capacity to respond to the pandemic, which was saddled with its own coordination challenges. The 
Trump Administration’s creation of multiple power centers without specification of the 
relationships among them did nothing to address the lack of clarity identified by HHS’s 2019 
Crimson Contagion exercises over the locus of pandemic response authority.  
 
When the COVID-19 virus first emerged in 2020, Trump’s Secretary of HHS, Alex Azar, 
responding to concerns that the Administration was insufficiently prepared to manage the 
pandemic response,198 insisted that White House coordination of pandemic-related matters was 
adequate.199 As late as the end of February 2020, he continued to insist that there was no need for 
a coronavirus “czar,” because the existing strategy was working very well.200 
 
A former senior U.S. official pointed out, however, that notwithstanding the creation of the 
White House Coronavirus Task Force, “[f]or the first time since 9/11, you don’t have someone 
directly and immediately reporting to the president responsible 24/7 for the major transnational 
threats we face—terror, cyber, pandemics.”201 Even some senior Trump Administration officials 
acknowledged that “It’s better to have one person who has the backing of the White House to 
coordinate.”202 According to a senior administration official, “the problem is no one is sure who 
is in charge,”203 leading to “conflicting signals within the White House’s disjointed response to 
the crisis.”204 Similarly, a high-ranking official from the George W. Bush Administration who 
worked on HIV-related matters opined that, “[t]here isn’t any clear direction as to what the 
                                                          
198 See also Kaczynski & Steck, supra note 186 (referring to scrutiny over the Trump Administration’s “preparations 
for the coronavirus pandemic”). 
199 Eric Lutz, High Gear?, VANITY FAIR, Feb. 26, 2020, https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2020/02/will-trump-kick-
coronavirus-response-into-high-gear. 
200 Strickler & Dilanian, supra note 104; Lutz, supra note 198 (reporting that Azar called the appointment of a “czar” 
to lead the pandemic response unnecessary, that the administration had the situation under control, and that federal 
interagency processes concerning the response were operating smoothly) 
201 Strickler & Dilanian, supra note 104. 
202 Id. 
203 Ashley Parker et al., Infighting, Missteps and a Son-in-Law Hungry for Results: Inside the Trump Administration’s 
Troubled Coronavirus Response, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/infighting-
missteps-and-a-son-in-law-hungry-for-action-inside-the-trump-administrations-troubled-coronavirus-
response/2020/03/14/530c28b4-6559-11ea-b3fc-7841686c5c57_story.html; see also Lena H. Sun & Josh Dawsey, 
CDC Feels Pressure from Trump as Rift Grows Over Coronavirus Response, WASH. POST, July 9, 2020, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/trump-sidelines-public-health-advisers-in-growing-rift-over-coronavirus-
response/2020/07/09/ad803218-c12a-11ea-9fdd-b7ac6b051dc8_story.html (quoting Beth Cameron’s view in the 
summer of 2020, as new cases of Covid-19 rose across the country, that “[a]t a time when our country needs an 
orchestrated, all-hands-on-deck response, there is simply no hand on the tiller”). 
204 Yasmeen Abutaleb, Ashley Parker & Josh Dawsey, Kushner Coronavirus Team Sparks Confusion, Plaudits Inside 
White House Response Efforts, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/kushner-
coronavirus-team-sparks-confusion-plaudits-inside-white-house-response-efforts/2020/03/18/02038a16-6874-11ea-
9923-57073adce27c_story.html; see also Ashley Parker, Yasmeen Abutaleb & Josh Dawsey, Trump Administration 
Has Many Task Forces—But Still No Plan for Beating Covid-19, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 2020, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-task-forces-coronavirus-pandemic/2020/04/11/5cc5a30c-7a77-
11ea-a130-df573469f094_story.html [hereinafter Parker at al., Still No Plan] (describing the Trump Administration’s 
pandemic response structure as “a bureaucratic nesting doll of groups with frequently competing aims and agendas”). 
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strategic goals are in each different line of effort.”205 Despite these warnings, the Azar, Pence, and 
Kushner-led teams, as well as state and local responders, appeared at times  to act independently 
of one another. 
 
Coordination can be a valuable means of preventing or reducing some of the more harmful 
features of independent government action (such as free-riding and lack of accountability).206  
Better coordination could have facilitated a more effective set of responses to the pandemic, such 
as a robust nationwide testing and tracing program capable of curbing the spread of the virus.207 
Instead, lack of coordination by the federal government impaired ability of health care providers 
to test for the virus.208  
 
Similarly, the lack of coordination among federal agencies played a part in CDC’s 
disastrous rollout of a test to detect the virus. The World Health Organization (WHO) publicized 
a recipe for configuring a COVID-19 test on January 13, 2020.209 Testing could not begin in the 
United States, however, until CDC developed a test that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
would authorize for emergency use.210 Instead of endorsing the WHO test, which seemed to be 
accurate, as nations such as Thailand quickly did, CDC scientists modified the test in an effort to 
identify the novel coronavirus even if it mutated. The new CDC test, however, generated false 
positives which were apparently linked to the CDC modification of the WHO test. At that point, 
CDC could have dropped the modification and forwarded the original WHO test to FDA to 
accelerate testing. Instead, it tried to manufacture a new batch of tests that would be free of 
contamination. Some CDC scientists lobbied for the unmodified WHO test to meet surging 
demand for testing. But those responsible for the CDC testing regime replied that the proposal was 
“a non-starter” because the FDA would never agree with it.  In fact, government officials later 
                                                          
205 Parker et al., Still No Plan, supra note 204. 
206 Cf. J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Problems in the Administrative State: 
A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 CAL. L. REV. 59, 70-71 (2010) (arguing that when obstacles such as transaction costs 
and other collective action challenges prevent coordination, the result may be a “tragedy of the regulatory commons” 
characterized by increased free ridership); Ben Depoorter, Horizontal Political Externalities: The Supply and Demand 
of Disaster Management, 56 DUKE L.J. 101, 115-16 (2006) (arguing that coordination between political actors can 
mitigate incentives to free ride on the efforts of other levels of government); Shi-Ling Hsu, A Game-Theoretic Model 
of International Climate Change Negotiations, 19 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 14, 32 (2011) (arguing that international 
coordination is necessary to prevent free riding in efforts to mitigate climate change). 
207 Berman, supra note 65, at 79. 
208 See Maggie Fox, Coronavirus Testing Is ‘A Mess’ in the US, Report Says, CNN, May 21, 2020, 
nn.com/2020/05/20/health/testing-coronavirus-cidrap-report/index.html. The report referred to in Fox’s story 
concluded that “[c]ritical guidance and coordination at the federal level is needed to meet the SARS-CoV-2 testing 
demand.” CENTER FOR INFECTIOUS DISEASE RESEARCH AND POLICY, COVID-19: THE CIDRAP VIEWPOINT 2 (May 
20, 2020), https://www.cidrap.umn.edu/sites/default/files/public/downloads/cidrap-Covid19-viewpoint-part3.pdf; see 
also id. at 4 (“For testing to be maximally effective, coordination across the system and across jurisdictions is 
necessary. Ideally, this requires federal guidance, leadership, and support, with strong jurisdictional buy-in at the state 
and local levels.”); Balz, Crisis, supra note 9 (“For months, the Trump Administration has been running behind to 
bring testing to the levels needed.”). 
209 David Willman, The CDC’s Failed Race Against Covid-19: A Threat Underestimated and a Test Overcomplicated, 
WASH. POST (Dec. 26, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/cdc-covid/2020/12/25/c2b418ae-
4206-11eb-8db8-395dedaaa036_story.html. 
210 CDC could not distribute its own test to public health labs without FDA approval, and FDA regulations prevented 
clinical labs from developing and conducting their own tests. Bob Ortega, How the Government Delayed Coronavirus 
Testing, CNN, Apr. 9, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/09/politics/coronavirus-testing-cdc-fda-red-tape-
invs/index.html. 
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indicated that FDA would have considered approving of the WHO test without the CDC 
modification.211 The absence of coordinated communication between CDC and the FDA thus 
slowed development of an approved COVID test. Eventually, Dr, Fauci intervened, imploring 
HHS to take charge. FDA finally told CDC that public health labs could use the WHO test, but by 
then 46 days had elapsed since WHO had publicly shared its test protocol. 
 
After FDA approved testing protocols, the lack of interagency coordination also hindered 
distribution of the tests and materials needed to administer them. The head of the Biomedical 
Advances Research and Development Authority, whom President Trump fired in April 2020, 
testified before Congress that he was “quite alarmed” over a shortage of swabs for testing.212 
According to one account, “[a] constant refrain from [Rick] Bright throughout his hearing was 
highlighting what he considered a lack of coordinated strategy from the White House.”213 That 
lack of coordination was not inevitable. In fact, a memorandum of agreement between CDC and 
three of the nation’s biggest associations of lab testing facilities after the outbreak of the Zika virus 
in 2016 called for extensive coordination in planning and communication between CDC, public 
health labs, and the commercial sector.214 But a combination of disinterest from the White House 
and overlapping but uncoordinated authority among CDC,215 FDA, and the Centers for Medicare 
& Medicaid Services apparently sidelined the cooperative efforts anticipated in the 2018 
agreement.216  
 
The Trump Administration’s failure to coordinate federal and state response measures 
plagued the nation’s effort to combat the virus even during the administration’s last weeks. Due to 
a combination of government-led and private initiatives, FDA was able to approve two different 
versions of a coronavirus vaccine in 2020 (the Pfizer-BioNTech and Moderna vaccines).217 But 
HHS Secretary Azar’s prediction that 20 million people would get vaccinated by the end of 2020218 
did not come to pass. CDC had issued an interim playbook about coronavirus vaccination in 
                                                          
211 Willman, supra note 209. 
212 Melissa Macaya et al., 5 Takeaways from Rick Bright’s House Hearing, CNN, May 15, 2020, 
https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/14/politics/key-moments-bright-hearing/index.html. 
213 Id.; see also Aaron C. Davis et al., Ousted Vaccine Official Testifies Country Still Lacks Master Plan Amid 
Pandemic, WASH. POST, May 14, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/ousted-vaccine-official-
testifies-country-still-lacks-master-plan-amid-pandemic/2020/05/14/e9b6cd64-960f-11ea-82b4-
c8db161ff6e5_story.html (“Bright said there is still “no master plan” for assessing the need for and distribution of 
masks, testing swabs and other medical equipment.”); Parker et al., Still No Plan, supra note 204 (“There is still no 
concerted plan for getting vital medical supplies to states, which are left to fight among themselves or seek favors 
from Trump.”).. 
214 Ortega, supra note 210.  
215 The CDC, which had developed experience in pandemic response in connection with malaria, smallpox, and 
HIV/AIDS, was largely sidelined in the Trump Administration’s response to the virus. Its leadership was pressured 
by Administration officials, including President Trump, to weaken or rescind its recommendations on personal 
conduct such as mask wearing and conditions for safe reopening of the economy. See Sun & Dawsey, supra note 203. 
216 See Ortega, supra note 210. 
217 U.S. Food and Drug Admin, COVID-19 Vaccines, https://www.fda.gov/emergency-preparedness-and-
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September 2020 and requested that states submit immunization plans.219 CDC briefings on the 
vaccine rollouts were short on detail, however. CDC failed to inform the states, for example, how 
many doses they would receive and when they would get them. Essentially, the Trump 
Administration left it up to the states to devise their own distribution strategies. In the absence of 
useful federal guidance, the states sought to coordinate among themselves by sharing advice about 
common logistical challenges. The administration blamed the slow pace of vaccination on 
excessively rigid adherence by the states to federal guidance about how to prioritize vaccination 
candidates. But others concluded that “[t]he delayed and disjointed vaccine rollout [was] the 
product of poor coordination between the federal government and the 50 states,” and that it had 
become clear that “the United States has not learned from its fractured pandemic response and 
risks repeating some of the same errors.”220 
V. LEARNING FROM FAILURE 
Even in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, sitting and former political leaders from 
both political parties recognized the urgent need to reform the government’s public health 
infrastructure, with many predicting that such reorganization will occur, much as the Department 
of Homeland Security was created in the aftermath of 9/11.221 Former Senate Majority Leader 
Tom Daschle, for example, remarked that “I don’t think there is any doubt that there will be a 
massive effort to reorganize government in the aftermath of COVID-19.”222 Senator Susan Collins 
agreed that “I would think some structural changes would come out of this. . . . We need some 
form of coordinating structure.”223 As noted above,224 federal legislators have introduced 
legislation that would draw upon the experience of the COVID-19 pandemic to improve the 
government’s capacity to prevent and manage future public health crises, either through 
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220 Id. The dean of the Brown University School of Public Health characterized the administration’s effort to blame 
the states for the slow pace of vaccinations as “political theater and obviously untrue. States undoubtedly have a critical 
role to play in vaccine distribution. But states alone can’t mount one of the largest vaccination efforts in recent history. 
Moreover, not all 50 states are failing.” Ashish K. Jha, Vaccination is Going Slowly Because Nobody is in Charge, 
WASH. POST (Dec. 31, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/12/31/vaccination-slow-trump-
administration-states/. According to Dr. Jha, resource-starved state agencies were “in no position to take on rapid 
deployment of a new vaccine without a lot more resources and help.” Id. Thus, a lack of coordination between the 
federal government and the states in financing the vaccination rollout contributed to its laggardly pace. 
221 See CAMACHO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 13, at 154-55. 
222 Carl Hulse, Does a Dept. of Pandemics Sound Odd? Homeland Security Once Did, Too, WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 
2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/11/us/coronavirus-pandemics-homeland-security.html. 
223 Id. 
224 See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3770368
DRAFT: Jan. 20, 2021 




congressional investigative committees,225 interagency task forces,226 or independent 
commissions.227  A significant component of these proposals would be an effort to identify and 
evaluate the lessons learned from the COVID-19 experience concerning how to structure effective 
pandemic planning and response authority.228 
 
Even the necessarily circumscribed evaluation of the planning and response failures that 
plagued the Trump Administration’s management of the pandemic in 2020 provided in this article 
already suggests a number of valuable lessons. First, the article illustrates several general 
postulates for policymakers and scholars to consider about the characterization and assessment of 
governmental authority.  More specifically, it offers a preliminary outline about the governance 
structures that may be better suited to effective pandemic planning and response.  
1.  Structural Governance Lessons from Federal COVID-19 Planning and Response  
 
We derive at least five generalizable lessons from our analysis of the COVID-19 
experience during 2020. More broadly, each of these lessons makes the case that how government 
authority is configured may often be a vital factor in the success or failure in achieving public 
policy goals.229 
First, whether intentionally or not, government authority is always allocated at some 
particular point along each of three dimensions—the extent to which authority is centralized, 
overlapping, and coordinated–and careful governance requires recognition of the tradeoffs that 
each dimensional choice entails. Decentralization, for example, can foster experimentation, 
                                                          
225 H. Res. 935, 116th Cong. (2020), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-resolution/935, which the 
House approved in 2020, would have established a select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis as an investigative 
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United States going forward in the future”). 
228 See, e.g., H.R. 6548, supra note 227, § 2(d)(2) (authorizing investigations into “the structure, coordination, 
management, policies, procedures and actions of Federal, State, and local governments and non-governmental entities 
relative to preparing for, detecting, preventing, and responding to epidemics and pandemics, whether  naturally 
occurring or caused by a State or non-State actor”); H.R. 6429, supra note 225, § 3(b)(10)-(11) (requiring the 
Commission to examine, evaluate, and make recommendations concerning “the role and responsibility of, and 
coordination among, departments and agencies of the United States, including but not limited to, the Department of 
Health and Human Services, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Food and Drug Administration, the 
Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Department of Defense, and the 
National Security Council” and “the nature and extent of communication and coordination between the Federal 
Government and State, territory, tribal, and local governments; between the Federal Government and the private 
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229 See CAMACHO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 13, at 229 (arguing that “decisions concerning how best to allocate or 
reallocate authority among different government entities are critical to the functioning of government programs”). 
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provide opportunities for diverse strategies, and leverage expertise; centralization may promote 
economies of scale and uniformity. Overlapping authority can create a safety net in the event of 
inaction by one authorized entity and creates resistance to agency capture, while distinct authority 
may eliminate wasteful duplication of effort and lower regulatory commons risks.  Coordination, 
the aspect of structural governance whose absence seems most responsible for the Trump 
Administration’s COVID management failures, can promote pooling of resources or expertise, 
reduce risks of free-riding and shirking, and minimize the risk of conflicting actions. But 
independence may minimize administrative costs and groupthink and may promote beneficial 
inter-governmental competition. 
How these competing values balance out is necessarily context-specific. It is also political 
in the sense that prioritization of values is necessary when different organizational alternatives 
create a different mix of advantages and disadvantages. In some instances, for example, achieving 
the efficiency advantages of coordinating authority in ways that enable resource pooling may be 
deemed more important than groupthink prevention. In other instances, the reverse may be true, 
suggesting that independent authority would be more desirable than coordination. 
Second, the tradeoffs are often unlikely to be the same for all aspects of a problem. Instead, 
they will typically vary for different governmental functions. Thus, for example, authority to 
pursue certain functions may best be centralized, such as when promoting economies of scale, 
ensuring uniform governmental action, or achieving cost internalization is important. The bulk 
purchase of COVID testing equipment by the federal government is an example of a function that 
would benefit from economies of scale or resource pooling,230 while the criteria for approval of 
vaccines clearly need to be developed and applied uniformly by a federal agency such as FDA. 
Federal authorities should be responsible for the issuance of travel restrictions to mitigate interstate 
(and international) spillover costs caused by spread of the virus. Decentralization may be a better 
fit for other functions, such as when particularized expertise, diversity of approach, or providing 
opportunities for regulatory experimentation are a significant priority. Inevitably, given the 
heterogeneity of activities involved in pandemic preparation and response, much of federal 
pandemic preparation and response will necessarily be decentralized. And both the creation and 
subsequent dissolution of the Directorate illustrate the value of relying on directed, dedicated 
expertise in federal pandemic planning and response activities. 
 
Third, it may be possible to mitigate the disadvantages of allocating authority on a 
dimension by allocating it differently for different functions.231 Overlapping authority in some 
cases can create a safety net to hedge against inaction by a single responsible entity.232 It can also 
                                                          
230 See, e.g., Paul Aubrecht et al., Centralized and Decentralized Responses to COVID-19 in Federal Systems: US and 
EU Comparisons, at 2 (2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3584182 (arguing that “there may 
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example, that in a federal system, procurement and distribution of medical supplies and equipment “may best be 
centrally administered in order [to] limit cross border externalities which may spill across the states in a federal system, 
to take advantage of economies of scale and distribution advantages of a centralized approach, . . . to prevent inefficient 
competition between states in the procurement of these material goods,” and to prevent hoarding). 
231 See CAMACHO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 13, at 232 (noting that “there may be opportunities to adjust along a 
dimension on a function-by-function basis to maximize the advantages at each end of the dimension”); id. at 94-99 
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more effectively leverage the advantages of each end of that dimension of authority). 
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make effective capture of agency decisionmakers harder by increasing the entities that must be 
captured before government policy is crafted to achieve a result desired by a private entity.233   
Overlapping authority, however, may lead to inefficient duplication of effort and the issuance of 
conflicting mandates or advice.234 The creation of multiple power centers to deal with pandemic 
management led to considerable overlapping authority that prompted confusion in disseminating 
information about matters such as the need for testing of asymptomatic individuals and the scope 
of the risks posed by airborne transmission of the virus.235 Overlap also may prompt inaction if 
multiple authorized entities await action by another such entity. If inaction is accompanied by 
finger-pointing when problems are not being effectively managed, accountability is impaired.236  
 
Policymakers need to be cognizant of these tradeoffs. They should be careful to rely on 
overlap only for functions where the safety net and anti-capture benefits are particularly vital—
such as in pandemic planning. With respect to response, overlapping authority to perform functions 
such as developing scientific information, analyzing data, and enforcing regulatory standards may 
create a desirable safety net to alleviate the risks of inaction by any one entity. In a context such 
as responding to public health crises that requires rapid government action, however, the stasis and 
languidity that overlap may induce are exactly the opposite of what is needed. Overlapping 
pandemic planning authority therefore might best be accompanied by clear and distinct authority 
for most functions in the thick of emergency pandemic response to help reduce the adverse effects 
of conflicting mandates and inaction. It may be desirable, for example, to create distinct authority 
for functions such as information dissemination and restrictions on travel to foster efficient 
resource allocation or avoid conflicting mandates. Further, the alternatives along each of the 
allocation dimensions are rarely simple binary choices. In particular, the choice of the extent of 
overlap is a continuum, allowing policymakers to choose not merely between overlapping or 
distinct authority but also between more and less overlap. As a result, policymakers may be able 
to reduce inefficiency costs from overlap while still maintaining some overlapping authority (and 
the resulting redundancy advantages).237  
 
Fourth, it also may be possible to mitigate the disadvantages of allocating authority along 
one dimension through the allocation chosen along a different dimension.238 For instance, while 
coordinated authority has stand-alone advantages and disadvantages as compared to independent 
authority, policymakers also can leverage a range of different forms of coordination to mitigate 
some disadvantages of inevitably overlapping authority (such as between state and federal 
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235 See supra notes 146-64 and accompanying text. 
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response agencies). Judicious hierarchical coordination, for instance, can help mitigate 
duplication, conflict, and inaction from overlapping authority.239  
Similarly, if policymakers choose a decentralized structure to provide pandemic 
management, its effectiveness will often depend on whether the various responsible entities with 
pandemic response authority act in coordination with one another. As previously demonstrated, 
the Trump Administration failed to provide even a minimally sufficient level of coordination in 
either pandemic planning or response, which both exposed the disadvantages of the decentralized 
authority while largely failing to tap its advantages.240 Decentralized planning has the capacity to 
leverage the expertise of different federal agencies and of state and local officials, but if the 
information and insights gleaned from those sources are not integrated into a coordinated planning 
effort, the resulting plans may have gaps or inconsistencies that hinder effective implementation. 
Decentralized (and overlapping) authority among federal agencies over various aspects of the 
COVID response, such as the development of testing protocols or the distribution of vaccines,241 
contributed to the spread of the virus. In contrast, carefully decentralized but coordinated authority 
would likely have better leveraged the experimentation, expertise, and diversity advantages of 
decentralization while minimizing risks of inconsistencies or conflicting responses to the 
pandemic. 
Fifth, perhaps the most pronounced lesson from federal planning for and response to 
COVID-19 relates to the heterogeneity of inter-governmental coordination. Unlike the other two 
dimensions, coordination does not simply toggle between more or less. Rather, the extent of 
coordination depends on a range of factors such as the form of communication, the extent of its 
formality, its frequency, its mandatory or discretionary nature, and its hierarchical or 
nonhierarchical character.242 Because of the availability of these various forms of inter-
governmental coordination, it is important to analyze not only whether coordinated or independent 
authority is desirable, but also the tradeoffs of choosing among these various types of 
coordination.243 In other words, electing to coordinate government institutions is only the first step. 
Various successive choices follow about the form and extent of coordination that are critical to its 
success. 
 
These tradeoffs may cut in different directions for various aspects of pandemic planning 
and response. For example, because pandemic planning typically takes place over a longer time 
horizon than response does, a collaborative process, in which decisions are reached by consensus 
by implicated governmental entities, may allow for a wide range on input by entities with differing 
perspectives, experience, and expertise. The 2017 National Defense Reauthorization Act244 
established just such a collaborative planning process. The Act required the Secretaries of Defense, 
HHS, Homeland Security, and Agriculture to jointly develop a national biodefense strategy and 
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associated implementation plan.245 The statutory directive to these cabinet Secretaries to issue a 
joint strategy and plan required all three agencies to agree on their contents.246 This is a horizontal 
form of coordination, in which adopting a plan depends on consensus and each agency in effect 
has a veto over the capacity of the others to dictate its contents. Such horizontal forms of 
coordination may also be good choices when uniformity is less of a priority or when there is less 
reason to expect or be concerned about free riding without hierarchical dictates.247   
 
Hierarchical authority, in which one agency or official has the power to dictate 
government-wide compliance and response, is a better choice for those aspects of pandemic 
response that require rapid action, such as distribution of testing equipment or vaccines. Vesting 
in one institution the authority to dictate the actions of other agencies is almost certainly the 
swiftest coordination alternative (with the possible exception of distinct, centralized authority) for 
implementing urgent functions, like the allocation of scarce medical supplies to the places that 
most urgently need them. Before the Biden Administration began, his transition team announced 
that the new administration would request that state governors issue mandatory mask directives 
with which local governments would have to comply.248 While the collaboration between the 
federal government and the states would be not be hierarchical, the duty of localities to implement 
state-issued mask mandates would be. 
 
Besides the level of synchronization, coordination also can be formal or informal; long or 
short-term; voluntary or mandatory, cooperative or adversarial; and frequent or occasional.  Each 
of these choices raises different tradeoffs for policymakers. In a fast-moving situation like 
responding to a viral pandemic, frequent information sharing is essential.249 In other, slower-paced 
situations, such as planning strategies for before then commencement of an outbreak, the lesser 
need for frequent communication may not justify the expense of conducting it. Similarly, many 
would consider it essential for a federal agency to mandate adherence by all the states with travel 
restrictions that are designed to slow the spread of the virus. However, the need for mandatory 
coordination may be less important in areas such as how to prioritize the individuals entitled to 
receive a COVID vaccine. Voluntary coordination is also an appropriate choice for certain forms 
of information exchanges in formulating response plans. For example, states and localities should 
have the opportunity but not the obligation to comment on proposed federal pandemic response 
plans. Federal officials responsible for developing such plans, however, should be required to 
solicit input from all affected entities. 
The requirement that executive agencies share information on biological outbreaks at the 
response phase of pandemic management250 is a weaker but longer-term form of horizontal 
coordination. The provision of the 2017 Act mandating that the plan provide for improved and 
                                                          
245 Pub. L. No. 114-238, § 1086 130 Stat. 2000, 2423-24 (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 104). 
246 Id. § 1086(a). 
247 See Erin O’Hara O’Connor & Larry E. Ribstein, Preemption and Choice-of-Law Coordination, 111 MICH. L. REV. 
647, 658 (2013) (“States’ ability to coordinate . . . often reduces or eliminates the need for federally imposed 
uniformity. . . .”). 
248 Biden Plan, supra note 109. 
249 See, e.g., Parker at al., Still No Plan, supra note 204 (“One Trump adviser said that the [Centers for Disease Control] 
has not provided local officials with enough data about what is happening nationwide.”). 
250 Id. § 1086(b)(4). 
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formalized interagency coordination and support mechanisms251 makes it clear that this type of 
coordination may not be informal, but otherwise fails to specify the respective roles of the four 
Departments or of the other federal agencies subject to the strategy and plan. Giving one agency, 
such as CDC, HHS, or FEMA, the authority to direct other public and private entities in the 
distribution of available medical supplies and equipment such as tests, masks, ventilators, or 
vaccines during a response would be a more hierarchical form of coordination for that particular 
task.252 
 
2. Reconfiguring Federal COVID-19 Planning and Response  
 
The Trump Administration’s allocational failures preceding and during the COVID-19 
pandemic suggest a number of possible reconfigurations that draw on these lessons to parse some 
of the allocational dimensions of authority and distinguish across governmental functions.   
 
Decentralized Federal Planning. A simple but devastating lesson of the COVID-19 
pandemic is that a federal presence in pandemic planning is crucial. In this sense, some amount of 
centralization in planning is vital for leveraging economies of scale and promoting uniformity 
among the myriad of regulatory and management authorities at the local, state, and federal levels 
that can influence the nation’s ability to prepare for public health crises. Nonetheless, it perhaps is 
also inevitable, in light of the broad and disparate nature of pandemics, that there be some if not 
significant decentralization of authority. In fact, the disbandment of the Global Health Security 
and Biodefense Directorate illustrates that the lack of a “point” agency dedicated to pandemic 
planning can create regulatory neglect.253 Some level of decentralization in planning can also 
leverage a wide range of agency expertise, lead to tailored planning strategies, and allow 
opportunities for governmental innovation and experimentation in planning.254 These 
effectiveness benefits appear to be worth sacrificing any efficiency losses resulting from the loss 
of economies of scale. They are especially worth pursuing on matters for which the uniformity 
benefits of centralization are not critical. 
Decentralized Federal Response. As it did with planning, the dissolution of the Directorate 
demonstrated both the need for a federal presence but also the value of a specific federal authority 
expressly assigned to promoting response, i.e., the implementation of pandemic planning. Indeed, 
the need for rapid deployment of response strategies weighs even stronger for reliance on 
decentralized response in order to tap a broader range of capabilities across government activities 
and regulatory sectors. In such instances, the expertise, experimentation, and diversity benefits of 
decentralized authority may be especially valuable. CDC, for example, may be the best choice to 
disseminate consistent and up-to-date information about the risks of virus spread and the best ways 
to stem those risks, while FEMA’s experience and expertise may favor putting it in charge of 
                                                          
251 Id. § 1086(b)(7). 
252 Cf. CAMACHO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 13, at 46 (explaining that “providing a governmental authority a de facto 
or express veto power over the activity of another authority” is “a more hierarchical form of coordination”). 
253 See supra notes 101-10 and accompanying text. 
254 Cf. Caitrin Reilly, When in Louisiana, Do As the French Do: The Case for Integrated River Basin Management in 
Louisiana, 30 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 41, 50 (2016) (noting that water management in France “emphasizes deconcentration 
and decentralization, which allows for management plans tailored to the needs of specific basins and input from all 
water users”). 
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distribution of medical supplies to areas ravaged by a pandemic. 255 Relatedly, authority can be 
structured to leverage public institutions in ways that leverage their relative institutional 
competencies. For example, more decentralized institutions can be assigned authority over certain 
functions with a more local footprint, while centralized institutions can be employed to deal with 
larger-scale issues (e.g., matters more prone to cross-jurisdictional externalities) or issues for 
which uniform approaches or solutions are particularly important (e.g., development of standards 
for approval of vaccines). 
Overlapping Planning. Though it might lead to increased inefficiencies due to duplication 
of effort, there are significant reasons to support reliance on a more overlapping configuration of 
federal pandemic planning.  Designed correctly, a decentralized, overlapping planning regime can 
promote interagency accountability and serve as a regulatory safety net that can limit the risk of 
regulatory inaction.256 In other words, the expectation is that the effectiveness gains of overlapping 
federal planning authority are likely to outweigh the efficiency costs from duplication. 
More Distinct Authority for Certain Response Actions. At least in some circumstances, 
however, the tradeoffs in pandemic response may tilt toward more distinct allocations of authority.  
The need for prompt, decisive action may lean toward more exclusive authority that reduces 
wasteful duplication or risks of a regulatory commons. The Trump Administration blamed the 
slow rollout of the COVID vaccines on the states.257 Had applicable law or a federal pandemic 
plan made it clear than a federal agency such as CDC or FEMA was exclusively responsible for 
rapid and equitable distribution of vaccines, that kind of hand washing of responsibility would not 
have been possible (or at least would have been even less credible).  Besides concerns regarding 
efficiency, less overlap can help avoid regulatory conflict and inconsistency.258 Nonetheless, in 
some circumstances it might make sense to provide for some regulatory redundancy over response 
actions, for example, when one anticipates that duplicative regulatory authority will increase the 
likelihood of government action. Allowing states to negotiate with pharmaceutical companies for 
the purchase of testing and other needed medical equipment, for instance, creates a safeguard 
against the risk that the President will refuse to invoke the Defense Production Act to bolster the 
production and distribution of such supplies.259 
Horizontally Coordinated Planning.  A key lesson of the COVID-19 pandemic is that 
effective interagency and inter-governmental coordination is vital for pandemic planning. Yet the 
form of coordination is key to leveraging the advantages of decentralized and overlapping 
authority.  Largely horizontal coordination of planning allows the pooling of resources and 
expertise and often will adequately advance concerns of lack of uniformity or harmonization that 
                                                          
255 During the 2020-2021 presidential transition, the Biden transition team indicated that it intended to enhance the 
role of FEMA, an agency whose raison d’étre is disaster response, in distribution of the COVID vaccines. Thomas 
Frank, Biden to Deploy FEMA for Vaccine Distribution, CLIMATEWIRE (Jan. 4, 2021), https://www-eenews-
net.gwlaw.idm.oclc.org/climatewire/stories/1063721633/print. 
256 Cf Walter G. Johnson, Note, Conflict over Cell-Based Meat: Who Should Coordinate Agencies in U.S. 
Biotechnology Regulation?, 74 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 478, 489–90 (2019) (“Congress frequently assigns agencies 
authority and responsibilities that overlap in substantive areas. Scholars list various reasons for this phenomenon, 
often arguing that the overlap offers benefits in effectiveness, interagency accountability, and avoiding stagnation.”). 
257 See supra note 220 and accompanying text. 
258 CAMACHO & GLICKSMAN, supra note _13, at 40. 
259 See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text. 
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can arise from decentralized and/or overlapping jurisdiction.260 Contributing factors to the Trump 
Administration’s failure to engage in effective horizontally coordinated planning include: (1) 
dismissal of the Obama Administration pandemic Playbook; (2) the failure to heed the lessons of 
its own Crimson Contagion exercise, which called out the need for further examination of “how 
federal interagency partners will coordinate with one another on a variety of pandemic influenza-
specific response activities”;261 (3) its disbandment of the Directorate for Global Health Security 
and Biodefense Directorate, which had been well positioned to lead a coordinated 
intergovernmental planning effort; and (4) the lack of clear guidance to state and local governments 
about how to integrate their plans with those of the federal government. By creating a vacuum at 
the federal level and largely leaving the states to their own devices, the administration undermined 
accountability for planning responsibilities and set the stage for the piecemeal response efforts that 
followed. Re-establishing horizontally coordinated federal planning is vital. 
Hierarchically Coordinated Response. In some contexts, independently exercised 
authority can diminish the risk of groupthink, spur innovation, or generate productive competition 
among agencies.262 Allowing independent action, such as state mask or social distancing 
requirements that the federal government is unwilling to impose, may be preferable to certain 
forms of coordination (such as required federal-state harmonization that may decelerate rather than 
accelerate governmental action or hierarchical coordination that requires states to accept 
safeguards they deem inadequate). Independently allocated authority is ill-suited, however, to 
functions such as information distribution, given the need to avoid confusion resulting from the 
dissemination of inconsistent information about the nature of health risks and the best ways to 
address them.263 Discrepancies in government advice on whether to wear masks, for example, 
created considerable confusion.264 Independent authority would also appear to be a disastrous 
choice in triage situations, where it is important, for example, to allocate medical equipment to the 
areas hardest hit by disease. The competition among the states for access to ventilators drove up 
the price of that equipment and hampered the ability of some of the hardest hit states, like New 
                                                          
260 See John D. Blum & Jordan Paradise, Public Health Preparedness & Response: An Exercise in Administrative 
Law, 20 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 1 (2018): 
Responses to epidemics, pandemics, and other biological disasters require multiple coordinated initiatives 
that combine sophisticated planning, sound emergency management, effective stockpiles, solid geographic 
information systems, well-developed laboratory surveillance and response, and effective management 
capabilities. Critical to the noted elements of planning and response is the existence of a legal structure, which 
underpins the operations of necessary programs. While the law may not be the first public health tool 
considered in a disaster, it is fundamental to the effective functioning of multiple actors and must be 
harmonized across jurisdictional lines. 
See also id. at 8 (“The massive amount of coordination across public and private actors in the face of biological 
catastrophes makes preparation and response planning a critical regulatory function.”). 
261 Crimson Contagion, supra note 189, at 46. 
262 CAMACHO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 13, at 47-48. 
263 See, e.g., Leslie E. Gerwin, Planning for Pandemic: A New Model for Governing Public Health Emergencies, 37 
AM. J.L. & MED. 128, 143 (2011) (contending that “the surfeit of information sources leave[s] us . . . skeptical and 
confused about the accuracy of conflicting claims”). 
264 See, e.g., Christina Farr, Why Scientists Are Changing Their Minds and Disagreeing During the Coronavirus 
Pandemic, CNBC, May 23, 2020, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/23/why-scientists-change-their-mind-and-
disagree.html; Zeynep Tufekci, Jeremy Howard & Trisha Greenhalgh, The Real Reason to Wear a Mask, THE 
ATLANTIC, Apr. 22, 2020, https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2020/04/dont-wear-mask-yourself/610336/. 
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York, to procure the equipment they needed.265 Coordinated distribution of that equipment could 
have minimized those problems. The bipartisan Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense (co-
chaired by former Democratic Vice Presidential candidate Joseph Lieberman and Republican Tom 
Ridge, the first Secretary of DHS) recognized the need to consider the appropriateness of 
coordinating on a function-by-function basis.  In its 2015 report, it decried the lack of coordination 
across a range of biodefense-related functions, including information gathering, information 
dissemination, monitoring, financing, and implementation of containment strategies.266 The 
COVID-19 pandemic thus painfully illustrated the imperative of coordinated inter-agency and 
inter-governmental response to implement pandemic planning. As noted above, however, deciding 
that coordination is required only begins to determine the appropriate allocations of authority. 
Policymakers should also consider the appropriate form of coordination. Although collaborative, 
horizontal coordination may work well for pandemic planning, for reasons described above, a 
different, more hierarchical form of coordination is more likely to promote effective pandemic 
response action. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Perhaps understandably, much of the discussion of the failed handling of the COVID-19 
pandemic has focused on the Trump Administration’s tardy,267 callous,268 reckless,269 
uninformed,270 and discriminatory response.271 Given these failings, even a rationally conceived 
and thoughtful allocation of authority may not have avoided a significant number of cases and 
deaths. Unfortunately, attending to the allocation of government authority alone is rarely if ever 
going to be sufficient to guarantee prevention of a pandemic or even effective response to an 
outbreak. Even a well-structured allocation may fail if the tools allocated to government 
institutions are deficient; if agency personnel and other government leaders are hostile to scientific 
evidence; if key Executive officials like the President are indifferent to the programs they are 
charged with implementing; or if Congress fails to provide the resources to allow effective 
                                                          
265 See Ruthann Robson, Positive Constitutionalism in A Pandemic: Demanding Responsibility from the Trump 
Administration, 12 CONLAWNOW 15, 20 (2020) (“Perhaps most chaotic has been the Administration's actions and 
inactions regarding necessary medical equipment, including ventilators to assist patients in breathing and personal 
protective equipment (PPE) for medical and other personnel to prevent them from becoming infected.”); Olorunnipa, 
Dawsey & Abutaleb, supra note 146 (“Some states are still struggling to procure testing kits and supplies for the kits, 
including swabs, and have pleaded for the federal government to play a larger role in coordinating purchases, resolving 
supply shortages, and distributing the kits.”). 
266 BLUEPRINT FOR BIODEFENSE, supra note 128, at 11-12, 26. The Panel regarded coordination as a vehicle for 
prioritizing needed activities, designating responsibilities, and ensuring accountability. Id. at 12. It did not, however, 
distinguish among the different forms of coordination. 
267 See, e.g., Trump Was Too Slow in Virus Response: Poll, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Apr. 16, 2020, 
https://www.barrons.com/news/trump-was-too-slow-in-virus-response-poll-01587086405. 
268 See, e.g., Glenn C. Altschuler, The Crude and Callous Coronavirus Calculation of Chris Christie and Donald 
Trump, THE HILL, May 10, 2020, https://thehill.com/opinion/white-house/497004-crude-and-callous-coronavirus-
calculation-of-christie-and-trump. 
269 See, e.g., Ed Pilkington, Trump Death Clock Seeks to Bring ‘Accountability for Reckless Leadership’, THE 
GUARDIAN, May 6, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/06/trump-death-clock-coronavirus-us. 
270 See Aja Romano, A New Investigation Reveals Trump Ignored Experts on Covid-19 for Months, VOX (Apr. 12, 
2020), https://www.vox.com/2020/4/12/21218305/trump-ignored-coronavirus-warnings. 
271 Eric Lipton et al., He Could Have Seen What Was Coming: Behind Trump’s Failure on the Virus, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 11, 2020 (updated May 11, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/11/us/politics/coronavirus-trump-
response.html?action=click&module=Spotlight&pgtype=Homepage. 
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administration. Moreover, some problems may be resistant to pre-planned, structured analysis and 
response. There may be relatively little the government can do, to pick an extreme example, to 
prepare for a collision between the Earth and a massive asteroid, even if astronomers warn 
policymakers of the impending disaster. 
 
Nonetheless, the Trump Administration’s confused and confusing allocation of authority 
over both pandemic planning and response made delay, inefficiency, and ineffectiveness almost 
inevitable. Those structural mistakes hold important lessons. By choosing appropriate allocations 
of authority along each of the three dimensions and differentiating allocations functionally, 
policymakers may be able to alleviate some of the dysfunctions that contributed to the Trump 
Administration’s chaotic and ineffective efforts to plan for and respond to the COVID-19 
pandemic. If so, the governmental planning and response to the next public health crisis may be 
more effective. 
 
Public and private institutions can and should prepare for and seek to minimize the 
uncertainty and disorder that accompany emergencies such as viral pandemics through vigilant 
planning and adaptive response.272 Effective disaster planning and response are not limited to 
designing effective substantive strategies or decision-making processes. They also include 
structuring authority to leverage public institutions in ways that tap their relative advantages and 
minimize their limitations—perhaps allocating overlapping authority for functions that 
particularly need safety net redundancies or deploying clear coordination mechanisms (particularly 
in pandemic response, where hierarchical coordination is critically important) to help promote 
prompt, efficient, and consistent action. Such allocations may not only leverage relative 
institutional competencies but also help public institutions manage uncertainty and promote 
adaptive response.273 
 
Because it is unlikely that future crises will replicate the COVID-19 outbreak in all or even 
most respects, approaches that might have worked better in reacting to this virus will not 
necessarily be the optimal ones for the next crisis. Instituting a public system of periodic 
monitoring and adjustment of decisions about how to allocate authority among relevant 
government officials, however, can further reduce uncertainties and promote learning. Many have 
called for integration of periodic monitoring and adaptive management mechanisms in decision-
making processes to manage uncertainty and develop more effective substantive strategies,274 
                                                          
272 See Caner Hamarat et al., Adaptive Policymaking Under Deep Uncertainty: Optimal Preparedness for the Next 
Pandemic, Proceedings of the 30th International Conference of the System Dynamics Society (2012) (transcript 
available at https://proceedings.systemdynamics.org/2012/proceed/papers/P1386.pdf) (noting that “[f]or an uncertain 
and complex future, adaptivity and flexibility should be the main aim for designing robust policies”); see also Fikret 
Berkes, Understanding Uncertainty and Reducing Vulnerability: Lessons from Resilience Thinking, 41 NAT. 
HAZARDS 283, 287 (2005) (discussing how focusing on adaptive management, or learning-by-doing, can support 
efforts to deal with uncertainty in crisis). 
273 See Alejandro E. Camacho, De- and Re-constructing Public Governance for Biodiversity Conservation, 73 VAND.  
L. REV. 1585 (2020). 
274 See, e.g., INT’L INST. FOR APPLIED SYS. ANALYSIS, ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT 
1 (C.S. Holling ed., 1978); PANARCHY: UNDERSTANDING TRANSFORMATIONS IN HUMAN AND NATURAL SYSTEMS 3 
(Lance H. Gunderson & C.S. Holling eds., 2002); GEORGE H. STANKEY ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ADAPTIVE 
MANAGEMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES: THEORY, CONCEPTS, AND MANAGEMENT INSTITUTIONS 31–33 (2005), 
www.fs.fed.us/pnw/pubs/ pnw_gtr654.pdf. 
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including in disaster planning and response.275 And one of us has also called for application of 
such a learning infrastructure at a more macro level, i.e., for monitoring and assessing program 
and agency performance.276 Our book also recommends, however, the creation of a framework for 
promoting structural adaptive governance that designates authority to a public agency to 
periodically monitor and assess the efficacy of allocational choices (here, for pandemic planning 
and response).277 Any changes that policymakers choose to improve pandemic preparedness and 
response capacity should be flexible enough to adjust if past or current experience reveals that an 
aspect of the structure of the government’s public health mechanisms is not providing efficient, 
effective, equitable, or accountable governance. 
 
The Trump Administration’s planning and response to the COVID-19 pandemic make 
clear that poorly designed programs are likely to create significant barriers to success. As 
policymakers craft mechanisms to improve the government’s capacity to address future public 
health crises, their goal should be to make organizational choices that facilitate rather than hinder 
effective pandemic responses. President John Kennedy often repeated a popular mistranslation278 
of a Chinese maxim that crisis requires awareness of danger, but also allows recognition of 
opportunity.279 As devastating as the current pandemic has been and promises to be, policymakers 
should seize upon the opportunity to transform lessons learned into efforts to adjust the institutions 
of government to better respond to public harms, if not prevent an epidemic in the first place. 
                                                          
275 See Daniel A. Farber¸ Catastrophic Risk, Climate Change, and Disaster Law, 16 ASIA PAC. J. ENVTL. L. 37, 48-49 
(2013) (arguing that disasters should be viewed as cyclical so that decision-makers can learn from past disasters, adapt 
policies to be more resilient in the future, and generate viable policy options in the face of uncertainty); Craig Anthony 
(Tony) Arnold, Adaptive Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CLIMATE DISASTER LAW 169, 177 (Rosemary Lyster & 
Robert R.M. Verchick eds., 2018) (discussing legal tools for promoting adaptation, including “regulations, contracts, 
and procedural rules to implement adaptive policies and strategies”); Charles R. Wise, Organizing for Homeland 
Security After Katrina: Is Adaptive Management What’s Missing?, 66 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 302, 306-07 (2006) (arguing 
that homeland security requires adaptive management, including for “professionals at various levels to work across 
boundaries, plan and negotiate future activities, and communicate during operations to resolve unanticipated 
problems”). 
276 See Alejandro E. Camacho, Adapting Governance to Climate Change: Managing Uncertainty Through a Learning 
Infrastructure, 59 EMORY L.J. 1, 64-76 (2009). Cf. David L. Markell & Robert L. Glicksman, Dynamic Governance 
in Theory and Application, Part I, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 563, 566 (2016) (providing a “conceptual framework to assist 
policymakers seeking to design regulatory structures likely to produce effective governance in dynamic 
circumstances”); Riyanti Djalante et al., Adaptive Governance and Managing Resilience to Natural Hazards, 2 INT’L 
J. DISASTER RISK SCI.1, 10 (2011) (outlining how adaptive governance, described as “polycentric and multilayered 
institutions, participation and collaboration, self-organization and networks, and learning and innovation,” can support 
resilience in disaster risk reduction efforts). 
277 CAMACHO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 13, at 236. We suggest delegating the authority to engage in these tasks to a 
new “learning infrastructure” agency or to an existing, relatively nonpartisan entity such as the Government 
Accountability Office. 
278 See Victor H. Mair, danger + opportunity ≠ crisis: How a misunderstanding about Chinese characters has led 
many astray, PĪNYĪN.INFO, http://www.pinyin.info/chinese/crisis.html (last visited June 8, 2020). The translation 
reflected in President Kennedy’s campaign speeches has nevertheless become a popular meme and “favorite rhetorical 
device of public figures across the political spectrum.”  Benjamin Zimmer, Crisis = Danger + Opportunity: The Plot 
Thickens, LANGUAGE LOG (March 27, 2007),  
http://itre.cis.upenn.edu/~myl/languagelog/archives/004343.html. 
279 Senator John F. Kennedy, Speech at the 1959 Convocation of United Negro College Fund, Indianapolis, Indiana, 
April 12, 1959, http://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/JFKSEN/0902/JFKSEN-0902-023. (last visited June 
8, 2020). 
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